Al-Jazeerah History
Archives
Mission & Name
Conflict Terminology
Editorials
Gaza Holocaust
Gulf War
Isdood
Islam
News
News Photos
Opinion
Editorials
US Foreign Policy (Dr. El-Najjar's Articles)
www.aljazeerah.info
|
|
Russia, Turkey and the Great Game:
Changing teams
By Eric Walberg
ccun.org, February 1, 2010
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s visit to Turkish last month
shows that Turkey and Russia are rapidly developing close economic and
political ties, notes For all intents and purposes, Turkey has
given up on the European Union, recognising it as a bastion of Islamophobia
and captive to US diktat. As Switzerland bans minarets and France moves to
outlaw the niqab, the popular Islamist government in Istanbul moves in the
opposite direction -- supporting the freedom to wear headscarfs, boldly
criticising Israel and building bridges with Syria. This is nothing less
than a fundamental realignment of Turkish politics towards Turkey’s natural
allies -- the Arabs ... and the Russians. This new alignment with
Russia began in 2001 when Turkish and Russian foreign ministers signed the
Eurasia Cooperation Action Plan. It went into high gear in February 2009,
when Turkish President Abdullah Gul made a state visit to Russia, including
a visit to the Russian Federation’s thriving and energy-rich Autonomous
Republic of Tatarstan, populated by a majority of Muslim Turks, with
pipelines, nuclear energy and trade the focus of attention. In the
past, Russia had poor relations with Turkey, which since its founding as a
republic in 1922 was firmly in the Western camp and seen by Moscow as a
springboard for infiltration into the Caucasus and its Turkic southern
republics. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Yeltsin’s Russia
acquiesced to US hegemony in the region, and as part of this opening to the
West, Turkish schools, construction firms and traders came in great numbers
to the ex-Soviet “stans” (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
Turkmenistan). 9/11 convinced Russian president Vladimir Putin to go so far
as welcoming US military bases in the most strategic “stans”. The old Great
Game appeared to be over, lost resoundingly by Russia. But as the
world tired of the US-sponsored “war on terrorism”, it seemed the Great Game
was not over after all. A NATO member, Turkey was soon joined by Bulgaria
and Romania, making the Black Sea a de facto NATO lake, alarming a now
resurgent Russia. Ukraine’s Western-backed “Orange Revolution” in
2004 further tilted the balance away from Russia, with Ukrainian President
Viktor Yushchenko defiantly vowing to join NATO and kick the Russian fleet
out of Crimea. He even armed Georgia in its war with Russia in 2008.
However, not only Russia was fed up with the new pax americana. Over 90 per
cent of Turks had an unfavourable view of the US by 2007. It is no surprise
that Turkey began to back away from unconditional support of NATO and the
US, notably, during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, by its refusal in 2008 to
allow US warships through the Bosphorus Strait to support Georgia, and by
its outspoken criticism of Israel following the invasion of Gaza that year.
In contrast to the US-sponsored colour revolutions in the
ex-socialist bloc, Turkey’s “Green Revolution” brought the
religious-oriented Justice and Development Party to power in 2002. Its
political direction has been in search of balance in the region and peaceful
relations with its neighbours, including Armenia and the Kurds. In 2004
Russian president Vladimir Putin signed a joint declaration of cooperation
in Ankara, updated in February 2009 by Gul and Russian President Dmitri
Medvedev in Moscow. Gul declared, “Russia and Turkey are neighbouring
countries that are developing their relations on the basis of mutual
confidence. I hope this visit will in turn give a new character to our
relations.” Key to this is Turkey’s proposal for the establishment
of a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. Following Gul’s visit,
Turkish media even described Turkish-Russian relations as a “strategic
partnership”, which no doubt set off alarm bells in Washington.
None of this would be taking place without solid economic interests.
Turkish-Russian economic ties have greatly expanded over the past decade,
with trade reaching $33 billion in 2008, much if it gas and oil, making
Russia Turkey’s number one partner. They may soon use the Turkish lira and
the Russian ruble in foreign trade. This is the context of
Medvedev’s visit 13 January to Ankara, which focussed primarily on energy
cooperation. Russia’s AtomStroiExport had won the tender for the
construction of Turkey’s first nuclear plant last year, and Medvedev was
eager to get final approval on Turkish cooperation in Gazprom’s South Stream
gas pipeline to Europe. Turkey will soon get up to 80 per cent of its gas
from Russia, but this dependency is no longer viewed as a liability in light
of the two countries’ new strategic relations. Just what will
happen to the West’s rival Nabucco pipeline, also intended to transit
Turkey, is now a moot point. Nabucco hopes to bring gas from Iran and
Azerbaijan to Europe through Turkey and Georgia. Given the standoff between
the West and Iran and the instability of Georgia, this alternative to
Russia’s plans looks increasingly unattractive. Azerbaijan, shrewdly, has
already signed up with South Stream. Kommersant quoted Gazprom
officials as saying that Turkey could soon join Italy and Germany as
Russia’s “strategic partner”. Italy’s ENI is co-funding the South Stream
project. The other arm of Gazprom’s pincer move around Ukraine is Nord
Stream, and Germany late last year gave its final approval for Nord Stream.
A Polish minister compared the Russia-Germany Nord Stream project to the
1939 Molotov-Ribbentropp pact, because the pipeline allows Russia to deliver
gas to Western Europe and “turn off the taps” to Ukraine in case it stops
paying or starts stealing gas as happened several times under the Orange
revolutionaries. Turkey is very much a key player in this new Great
Game, only it appears to have changed sides. The Russian and Turkish prime
ministers voiced the hope that their trade would triple by 2015, and
announced plans to for a visa-free regime by May this year. “In the end,
without doubt, [a visa-free regime] will lead to activating cooperation
between our countries,” said Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan.
The presidential elections now in progress in Ukraine could take some of the
wind out of the sails of South Stream. Its rationale could be brought into
question if the new Ukrainian president succeeds in convincing Moscow that
s/he will make sure no further hanky-panky takes place. Ukraine, in dire
economic straits, needs the transit fees, which would disappear if current
plans go ahead. But the damage the Orange revolutionaries did to Ukraine’s
economy and relations with Russia is already a fait accompli. Says Alexander
Rahr at the German Council on Foreign Relations, “Under every leadership,
Ukraine will try to make use of its geographical position and the Russians
realised this some time ago. This is why they desperately need a way to
circumvent Ukraine.” Even if Ukraine, too, changes teams and
rejects NATO expansion plans, it will still have to thrash out a new role,
most likely minus its gas transit commissions. Contender Viktor Yanukovich
has signalled he would sign up to an economic cooperation agreement with
Russia and smooth over existing political problems like the question of the
Russian fleet and possibly the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Turkey could well follow suit. “If any Western country is going to recognise
the independence of Abkhazia, it will be Turkey because of a large Abkhazian
diaspora there,” says Rahr. There is no reason why Ukraine couldn’t
join the budding Russian-Turkish alliance, founded on regional stability and
peace, unlike the current NATO-led one of confrontation and enmity. This
would leave only the mad Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili quixotically
fighting his windmills, dictator of a rump state -- the very opposite of his
intended role as NATO’s valiant knight leading its march eastward. Even
inveterate Turkish foe Armenia seems eager to join the new line-up, as last
year’s exchange of ambassadors demonstrated.
Eric Walberg can be reached at
http://ericwalberg.com/
|
|
|