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	 Russia, Turkey and the Great Game: 
	 
	Changing teams  
	By Eric Walberg 
	ccun.org, February 1, 2010 
	   Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s visit to Turkish last month 
	shows that Turkey and Russia are rapidly developing close economic and 
	political ties, notes    For all intents and purposes, Turkey has 
	given up on the European Union, recognising it as a bastion of Islamophobia 
	and captive to US diktat. As Switzerland bans minarets and France moves to 
	outlaw the niqab, the popular Islamist government in Istanbul moves in the 
	opposite direction -- supporting the freedom to wear headscarfs, boldly 
	criticising Israel and building bridges with Syria. This is nothing less 
	than a fundamental realignment of Turkish politics towards Turkey’s natural 
	allies -- the Arabs ... and the Russians.    This new alignment with 
	Russia began in 2001 when Turkish and Russian foreign ministers signed the 
	Eurasia Cooperation Action Plan. It went into high gear in February 2009, 
	when Turkish President Abdullah Gul made a state visit to Russia, including 
	a visit to the Russian Federation’s thriving and energy-rich Autonomous 
	Republic of Tatarstan, populated by a majority of Muslim Turks, with 
	pipelines, nuclear energy and trade the focus of attention.    In the 
	past, Russia had poor relations with Turkey, which since its founding as a 
	republic in 1922 was firmly in the Western camp and seen by Moscow as a 
	springboard for infiltration into the Caucasus and its Turkic southern 
	republics. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Yeltsin’s Russia 
	acquiesced to US hegemony in the region, and as part of this opening to the 
	West, Turkish schools, construction firms and traders came in great numbers 
	to the ex-Soviet “stans” (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
	Turkmenistan). 9/11 convinced Russian president Vladimir Putin to go so far 
	as welcoming US military bases in the most strategic “stans”. The old Great 
	Game appeared to be over, lost resoundingly by Russia.   But as the 
	world tired of the US-sponsored “war on terrorism”, it seemed the Great Game 
	was not over after all. A NATO member, Turkey was soon joined by Bulgaria 
	and Romania, making the Black Sea a de facto NATO lake, alarming a now 
	resurgent Russia.   Ukraine’s Western-backed “Orange Revolution” in 
	2004 further tilted the balance away from Russia, with Ukrainian President 
	Viktor Yushchenko defiantly vowing to join NATO and kick the Russian fleet 
	out of Crimea. He even armed Georgia in its war with Russia in 2008.    
	However, not only Russia was fed up with the new pax americana. Over 90 per 
	cent of Turks had an unfavourable view of the US by 2007. It is no surprise 
	that Turkey began to back away from unconditional support of NATO and the 
	US, notably, during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, by its refusal in 2008 to 
	allow US warships through the Bosphorus Strait to support Georgia, and by 
	its outspoken criticism of Israel following the invasion of Gaza that year.
	   In contrast to the US-sponsored colour revolutions in the 
	ex-socialist bloc, Turkey’s “Green Revolution” brought the 
	religious-oriented Justice and Development Party to power in 2002. Its 
	political direction has been in search of balance in the region and peaceful 
	relations with its neighbours, including Armenia and the Kurds. In 2004 
	Russian president Vladimir Putin signed a joint declaration of cooperation 
	in Ankara, updated in February 2009 by Gul and Russian President Dmitri 
	Medvedev in Moscow. Gul declared, “Russia and Turkey are neighbouring 
	countries that are developing their relations on the basis of mutual 
	confidence. I hope this visit will in turn give a new character to our 
	relations.”    Key to this is Turkey’s proposal for the establishment 
	of a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. Following Gul’s visit, 
	Turkish media even described Turkish-Russian relations as a “strategic 
	partnership”, which no doubt set off alarm bells in Washington.    
	None of this would be taking place without solid economic interests. 
	Turkish-Russian economic ties have greatly expanded over the past decade, 
	with trade reaching $33 billion in 2008, much if it gas and oil, making 
	Russia Turkey’s number one partner. They may soon use the Turkish lira and 
	the Russian ruble in foreign trade.    This is the context of 
	Medvedev’s visit 13 January to Ankara, which focussed primarily on energy 
	cooperation. Russia’s AtomStroiExport had won the tender for the 
	construction of Turkey’s first nuclear plant last year, and Medvedev was 
	eager to get final approval on Turkish cooperation in Gazprom’s South Stream 
	gas pipeline to Europe. Turkey will soon get up to 80 per cent of its gas 
	from Russia, but this dependency is no longer viewed as a liability in light 
	of the two countries’ new strategic relations.    Just what will 
	happen to the West’s rival Nabucco pipeline, also intended to transit 
	Turkey, is now a moot point. Nabucco hopes to bring gas from Iran and 
	Azerbaijan to Europe through Turkey and Georgia. Given the standoff between 
	the West and Iran and the instability of Georgia, this alternative to 
	Russia’s plans looks increasingly unattractive. Azerbaijan, shrewdly, has 
	already signed up with South Stream.   Kommersant quoted Gazprom 
	officials as saying that Turkey could soon join Italy and Germany as 
	Russia’s “strategic partner”. Italy’s ENI is co-funding the South Stream 
	project. The other arm of Gazprom’s pincer move around Ukraine is Nord 
	Stream, and Germany late last year gave its final approval for Nord Stream. 
	A Polish minister compared the Russia-Germany Nord Stream project to the 
	1939 Molotov-Ribbentropp pact, because the pipeline allows Russia to deliver 
	gas to Western Europe and “turn off the taps” to Ukraine in case it stops 
	paying or starts stealing gas as happened several times under the Orange 
	revolutionaries.   Turkey is very much a key player in this new Great 
	Game, only it appears to have changed sides. The Russian and Turkish prime 
	ministers voiced the hope that their trade would triple by 2015, and 
	announced plans to for a visa-free regime by May this year. “In the end, 
	without doubt, [a visa-free regime] will lead to activating cooperation 
	between our countries,” said Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan.   
	The presidential elections now in progress in Ukraine could take some of the 
	wind out of the sails of South Stream. Its rationale could be brought into 
	question if the new Ukrainian president succeeds in convincing Moscow that 
	s/he will make sure no further hanky-panky takes place. Ukraine, in dire 
	economic straits, needs the transit fees, which would disappear if current 
	plans go ahead. But the damage the Orange revolutionaries did to Ukraine’s 
	economy and relations with Russia is already a fait accompli. Says Alexander 
	Rahr at the German Council on Foreign Relations, “Under every leadership, 
	Ukraine will try to make use of its geographical position and the Russians 
	realised this some time ago. This is why they desperately need a way to 
	circumvent Ukraine.”    Even if Ukraine, too, changes teams and 
	rejects NATO expansion plans, it will still have to thrash out a new role, 
	most likely minus its gas transit commissions. Contender Viktor Yanukovich 
	has signalled he would sign up to an economic cooperation agreement with 
	Russia and smooth over existing political problems like the question of the 
	Russian fleet and possibly the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
	Turkey could well follow suit. “If any Western country is going to recognise 
	the independence of Abkhazia, it will be Turkey because of a large Abkhazian 
	diaspora there,” says Rahr.   There is no reason why Ukraine couldn’t 
	join the budding Russian-Turkish alliance, founded on regional stability and 
	peace, unlike the current NATO-led one of confrontation and enmity. This 
	would leave only the mad Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili quixotically 
	fighting his windmills, dictator of a rump state -- the very opposite of his 
	intended role as NATO’s valiant knight leading its march eastward. Even 
	inveterate Turkish foe Armenia seems eager to join the new line-up, as last 
	year’s exchange of ambassadors demonstrated. 
	 Eric Walberg can be reached at
	http://ericwalberg.com/ 
	 
       
       
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