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How to End the Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan
By Farhang Jahanpour
TFF, ccun.org, June 9, 2009
TFF Associate, Farhang Jahanpour, is an Iranian born British
scholar. He reminds us about the contemporary history of these countries
and about the West's involvement back in time - which is vitally important
for understanding today's situation. And he ends the analysis with a
series of constructive proposals as to what can be done, rather much in
contrast to what President Obama seems to try to do.
On Wednesday 6th May President Barack Obama met with Pakistan's
President Asif Ali Zardari and Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai to try
to find a solution to the fast deteriorating situation in both Afghanistan
and Pakistan and to develop his strategy towards those two countries.
After the meetings, President Obama praised the two leaders and said that
the three of them would work together on a long-term basis to defeat
terrorism. This is despite the fact that a few days earlier, in a speech
on the occasion of his 100th day in office, President Obama had poured
scorn on the Pakistani president's "very fragile" government, which lacked
"the capacity to deliver basic services" and did not enjoy "the support
and the loyalty of their people".
Nearly eight years after the
start of the war in Afghanistan not only has that country not been turned
into a functioning democracy, Afghanistan's much larger neighbour Pakistan
has also been destabilised. On 12th April 2008, former President George
Bush told ABC news that the most dangerous area in the world was neither
Iraq, nor Afghanistan, but Pakistan. The insurgency in Afghanistan is now
affecting Pakistan and the instability in Pakistan is fuelling the war in
Afghanistan. On 28th February 2008, Admiral Michael McConnel, director of
National Intelligence, informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that
President Hamid Karzai's government controlled less than a third of
Afghanistan, but that the Taliban were present virtually everywhere.(1)
Since then, the situation has grown steadily worse in both countries.
Meanwhile, instead of withdrawing its forces from Afghanistan, the US
government is surging their number to nearly 80,000 US and NATO troops.
The repeated bombings of suspected insurgents has resulted in a large
number of civilian deaths, which further infuriates and alienates the
population. On 5th May 2009, an air attack in Bala Boluk district in Farah
province killed at least 100 civilians, two-thirds of them children and
teenagers.(2)
Reuters reported: "Villagers brought truckloads of bodies to the capital
of a province in Western Afghanistan on Tuesday to prove that scores of
civilians had been killed by U.S. air strikes in a battle with the
Taliban."(3)
Ghulan Farooq, a member of parliament from the province where the bombing
took place, said that "as many as 150 people had died."(4)
The incident stands as the largest civilian toll in Afghanistan since
August 2008, when the US killed at least 90 civilians in the neighbouring
Herat Province. In that case, the US angrily denied the allegations for
months, finally admitting to killing many civilians but insisting it was
legitimate.(5)
The fact that the villagers have to carry the dead bodies of their loved
ones to the capital of the province in trucks to prove the killings is bad
enough, but the dismissive attitude of US military officials towards the
'collateral damage', despite President Karza'i's repeated protests, is
more worrying.
Not only has the situation in Afghanistan
deteriorated, but there is now serious risk of instability in Pakistan,
possibly resulting in the collapse of the fledgling democratic government.
Only a few weeks after the government reached a cease-fire in the
north-west Swat Valley, giving the Taliban free rein to impose Shari'a
law, the Taliban extended their control over an adjacent district known as
Buner, less than 60 miles from Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. This
sent shivers down the spines of not only the Pakistani government, but
also the Americans who are worried about a new safe haven for the Taliban
and Al Qaeda, enabling them to plot further attacks against Afghanistan
and even the United States.
Coinciding with Zardari's visit to
Washington, and under strong US pressure, on 26 April 2009 Pakistani
forces attacked the militants in Swat Valley, killing over 1,000 militants
according to Pakistani sources. Over two million residents of Swat Valley
have been displaced according to UN figures, the most extensive case of
internal displacement since the partition of India, thus intensifying the
anti-American feelings among the Pakistani public. Although in the short
term the campaign against the militants may seem successful, it can store
up more trouble for the future. Already we have seen a backlash and a
taste of what may be coming. On 27th May a massive car bomb turned the
police building in Lahore into rubble, killing dozens and wounding
hundreds of policemen and civilians in Pakistan's second city. Nearby
offices of the ISI intelligence service were also damaged.(6)
Terrorist Attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India The
insurgents in Afghanistan are growing bolder by the day. In June 2008, a
guerrilla contingent on motorbikes attacked the prison in Kandahar and
freed over 1,000 prisoners. The frontier city of Peshawar boasts a major
air base and military garrisons. In December 2008, 200 Taliban guerrillas
methodically ransacked depots with NATO supplies. After assuring the
outnumbered guards that they would not be killed if they agreed never to
work there again the militants shouted “God is great” through bullhorns.
They then grabbed jerrycans and made several trips to a nearby gas station
for fuel, which they dumped on the cargo trucks and Humvees before setting
them ablaze, and destroying 300 vehicles.
The attack provided
further evidence of how extensively militants now rule the critical region
east of the Khyber Pass, the narrow gorge through the mountains on the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border, through which most of American supplies pass.
Khyber’s downward spiral is jeopardising NATO’s most important supply
line, sending American military officials scrambling to find alternative
routes into Afghanistan through Russia and Central Asia and maybe through
Iran that provides the shortest routes. The situation has grown more
critical and urgent as the result of Kyrgyzstan's decision to close Manas
base, the only US base in Central Asia, that is a vital transit point for
Nato and US operations in Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, India has not
remained immune to the attacks from the terrorists. In November 2008,
India's main commercial centre Mumbai suffered one of the worst terrorist
attacks in recent history. In the same way that the Twin Towers were
chosen as the symbols of American economic dominance, the attack on the
Taj Mahal Hotel on 27th November by Pakistani militants, killing 101
people and injuring 287 more, was also symbolic. The Taj Mahal Hotel was
built in 1903 - the dream of a member of the Indian Parsi community,
Jamsetji Tata – and was the first building in Bombay to be lit by electric
lights. The triumphal arch between the hotel and the bay, the Gateway to
India, was built to commemorate the 1911 landing of King George V. As
one of the terrorists set out in his murderous rampage in the hotel, he
screamed "Remember Babri Masjid!" He was referring to the 16th century
mosque built by Babur and destroyed by Hindu militants in 1992. Hafiz
Saeed who founded the Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) said: "India has
shown us this path. We would like to give India a tit-for-tat response and
reciprocate in the same way by killing the Hindus, just like it is killing
the Muslims in Kashmir."(7)
This militancy is not unique to Lashkar-e Taiba. Babu Bajrangi of
Ahmedabad, India, who sees himself as a democrat not a terrorist, was one
of the major lynchpins of the 2002 Gujarat genocide and has said (on
camera): "We didn't spare a single Muslim shop, we set everything on
fire? We hacked, burned, set on fire? I have just one last wish? Let me be
sentenced to death? I don't care if I'm hanged... just give me two days
before my hanging and I will go and have a field day in Juhapura where
seven or eight lakhs [7 or 8 hundred thousand] of these people stay... I
will finish them off? let a few more of them die... at least twenty-five
thousand to fifty thousand should die."(8)
Therefore, it is no exaggeration to suggest that the situation in
Afghanistan and Pakistan is the most dangerous in the world, goes beyond
the boundaries of the two nations and poses the greatest challenge to
America. On 23rd January 2009, introducing Richard C. Holbrooke as the
special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, President Obama declared that
both Afghanistan and Pakistan would be the "central front" in the War on
Terror. On the same day, a U.S. spy plane killed at least 15 in Pakistan
near the Afghanistan border. It was the first violation of Pakistan's
sovereignty under the new administration.
Recently, the New York
Times revealed President Bush's secret authorisation last July to launch
U.S. air strikes and ground operations across the Durand Line, without
consulting Islamabad. These attacks mainly by drones, killing a large
number of civilians as well as alleged terrorists, have aroused fury in
Pakistan. The New York Times has reported that during the past year alone
at least 2,118 civilians have been killed in Afghanistan.(9)
According to some estimates, about 20,000 Afghans have been killed and
over 50,000 have been injured since US invasion.(10)
The New US Strategy for Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke's appointment
as the special US envoy in charge of Afghanistan and Pakistan (to which he
refers dismissively as AfPak) was meant to co-ordinate US efforts against
the Taliban on both sides of the border. However, the omission of India
from Holbrooke's remit was a source of surprise, not to mention a sharp
departure from Obama's own previously-stated approach of engaging India,
as well as Pakistan and Afghanistan, in a regional dialogue, especially
over Kashmir. According to many reports, India vigorously and successfully
lobbied the US Administration to make sure that neither India nor Kashmir
was included in Holbrooke's official brief, thus taking out a major factor
in the conflict that affects the relations of the three countries. The
solution of the Kashmir problem is essential for diverting Pakistan's
attention from its tense borders with India and concentrating on
confronting the Taliban and its frontier with Afghanistan instead.
The New York Times reported that according to a senior administration
official President Obama intended to adopt a tougher line toward Hamid
Karzai as part of a new American approach to Afghanistan that will put
more emphasis on waging war than on development. "Mr. Karzai is now seen
as a potential impediment to American goals in Afghanistan, the official
said, because corruption has become rampant in his government,
contributing to a flourishing drug trade and the resurgence of the
Taliban."(11)
President Karzai's brother has been allegedly implicated in drugs
smuggling, something that he denies. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
has on a number of occasions referred to Afghanistan as a narco-state.
Among those pressing for Mr. Karzai to do more are Vice President
Joseph R. Biden Jr. and Holbrooke. They say that the Obama Administration
would work with provincial leaders as an alternative to the central
government, and it would leave economic development and nation-building
increasingly to European allies, so that American forces could focus on
the fight against insurgents. Defence Secretary Robert M. Gates said that
there was not enough “time, patience or money” to pursue overly ambitious
goals in Afghanistan, and he called the war there “our greatest military
challenge.”(12)
Certainly, the situation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan has deteriorated
and requires urgent action.
This strategy of engaging provincial
leaders would undermine the central government and would create greater
chaos in the country. There are also some suggestions to replace Karzai –
so much for democracy! However, it may be difficult to find someone who is
both acceptable to Washington and to most Afghans. These decisions seem to
be hasty moves, taken out of desperation due to the deteriorating
situation, rather than looking at the root causes of the problem. If we
wish to see an end to the problems in Afghanistan and to the unfortunate
term 'war on terror' we must look and see how this terrorism started.
Problems faced by Pakistan
Pakistan is certainly facing an existential threat from the militants.
These militants are in turn the result of a number of unresolved issues in
Pakistan's history. Pakistan is suffering from three destabilising
problems; the first is Kashmir, the second is Balochistan, and the third
is the presence of a large number of Pashtuns on its territory as the
result of the artificially drawn Durand Line, which separates Afghanistan
from Pakistan.
1. The partition of India and the creation of
Pakistan triggered the massacre of more than a million people and the
largest migration of human population in contemporary history. Eight
million people fled, Hindus fleeing the new Pakistan and Muslims fleeing
the new Hindu-dominated India. It has left Kashmir trapped in a nightmare
from which it can't seem to emerge, a nightmare that has claimed more than
60,000 lives. The fate of that province was supposed to be decided by a
referendum to see if the people would like to remain as part of India or
join Pakistan. As Kashmir has a large majority of Muslims, India has been
reluctant to go ahead with the referendum, and the dispute over Kashmir
has already led to a few wars between India and Pakistan and the
nuclearisation of both of them.
2. The second problem concerns
Balochestan. On August 11, 1947, the British handed control of Balochistan
to the ruler of Balochistan, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan. The Khan immediately
declared the independence of Balochistan, and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the
founder of Pakistan, also signed the proclamation of Balochestan’s
sovereignty under the Khan. The next day, the New York Times even printed
a map of the world showing Balochistan as a fully independent country.
Afghanistan claims that initially Balochistan was part of its territory
and its annexation by Britain and later by Pakistan has been illegal and
has made it completely landlocked. Meanwhile, there are secessionist
tendencies among the Balochis who wish to have their own independent
state.
3. As far as Pakistan and Afghanistan are concerned, the
Durand Line is the most problematic. The Durand Line is named after Sir
Mortimer Durand, the foreign secretary of the British Indian government,
and is the term used for the 2,640-kilometre (1,610-mile) border between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. After reaching a virtual stalemate in two wars
against the Afghans, the British forced Emir Abdur Rahman Khan of
Afghanistan on November 12, 1893 to come to an agreement under duress to
demarcate the border between Afghanistan and what was then British India
(now North-West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.), Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (F.A.T.A.) and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan).
This was part of the so-called Great Game to demarcate the boundaries of
the spheres of influence between the Tsarist Russia and the British Empire
in India. India's 19th century British viceroy, Lord Curzon, claimed
Afghanistan was "a purely accidental geographic unit." British Prime
Minister Benjamin Disraeli advocated subsuming Afghanistan into British
India. Failing that, in 1893 the British drew a line down the Hindu Kush
(the Durand line), dividing Afghan tribal homelands between Afghanistan
and the then British colony of India.(13)
Also, in May 1834 the Afghans lost Peshawar to the Sikhs.
After
Indian independence and the establishment of Pakistan, Afghanistan's loya
jirga (parliament) of 1949 declared the Durand Line invalid (since British
India ceased to exist in 1947 with the independence of Pakistan).(14)
On September 30, 1947, at the UN General Assembly meeting, Afghanistan
even cast a vote against the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations.
This had no tangible effect because world courts have universally upheld
the principle that bilateral agreements with or between colonial powers
are "passed down" to successor independent states, as with most of Africa.
Thus, the Durand Line boundary remains in effect today as the
international boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and is recognised
as such by most nations. Initially, the treaty was to stay in force for a
100-year period. Successive Afghan rulers have repudiated it. Even Hamid
Karzai has called the Durand Line a "line of hate," because by cutting
through tribal lands it artificially divides the Pashtun people, whom
Kabul would like to claim as Afghans.
According to the Afghans,
this disputed land was legally to be returned to Afghanistan in 1993 after
the 100-year old Durand Treaty expired, similar to the way in which Hong
Kong was returned to China. Kabul has refused to renew the Durand Line
treaty since 1993 when it expired. From 2003 to the present, Pakistani
military patrols have established bases up to a kilometre or two on the
Afghanistan side of the boundary in the Yaqubi area.
Ever since the
establishment of the Durand Line, every government in Islamabad, whether
military or non-military, has desperately tried to reach a bilateral
agreement with successive regimes in Kabul to convert the Durand Line into
the international border, but without any success. Despite propping up
several pro-Pakistan regimes in Kabul, Islamabad was unable to get any of
them to endorse the Durand Line as the international border. In 1996, when
the Durand agreement and line completed a century, it was considered to
have lapsed. Consequently, Pakistan's de jure western border ceased to
exist.
This realisation made it imperative for Pakistan to get even
more deeply involved in determining who rules in Kabul. According to a US
House Republican Research Committee Task Force on Terrorism and
Unconventional Warfare report, Islamabad has always been anxious to secure
a docile Pashtun-dominated government in Kabul.(15)
This explains Islamabad's continuing and increasing involvement in
Afghan affairs. This serves several strategic purposes for Islamabad.
First, by co-opting the Pashtuns and promising them rule over Kabul, it
neutralises the group that was most likely to challenge the non-existent
Durand Line. Second, a pro-Pakistan regime in Kabul is more likely to
ensure the de facto preservation of the lapsed and abrogated Durand Line,
even if it cannot be converted into an international border. Third, a
Pakistani-dominated Afghanistan would then constitute a forward strategic
depth against India on Pakistan's western flank.
Thanks largely to
the part it was forced to play as America's ally, first in its war in
support of the Afghan Islamists (the Mujahedin) and then in its war
against them, Pakistan, whose territory is reeling under these
contradictions, is careering towards civil war. The terrorist training
camps, the fire-breathing mullahs, and the fanatics who believe that Islam
will, or should, rule the world are mostly the result of two Afghan wars.
If Pakistan collapses, Iran, India and Afghanistan and other Middle
Eastern states can look forward to having millions of "non-state actors"
with an arsenal of nuclear weapons at their disposal as neighbours.
Britain's former viceroy to India, Lord Curzon, famously remarked that
"no patchwork scheme will settle Waziristan problem… Not until the
military steam-roller has passed over the country from end to end, will
there be peace. But I do not want to be the person to start that machine."(19)
I hope the new US Administration will not try to pick up where Curzon left
off, or to try to engage in a venture that even the British Empire refused
to contemplate.
Washington wants what Pakistan will not or cannot
deliver, except to a modest degree – namely the uprooting of Taliban and
al-Qa'ida from Pakistan – because the Taliban and to some extent the al-Qa'ida
enjoy widespread sympathy among militant Pashtuns and Pakistanis.
Washington wants a compliant Pakistan that will dutifully play its
assigned role in the U.S. regional vision. Washington will try to achieve
its goal any way it can get it, with or without democracy. So the U.S.
calls for democracy are now issued in panic and ring hollow after six
years of support for the Musharraf dictatorship. Pakistani liberals
condemn the U.S. for supporting the Pakistani military dictatorship for so
long in the name of an unpopular “war against terror”, and perceive the
present confrontation with the Taliban as only serving to inflame the
militant jihadists.
Mounting public dissatisfaction with President
Musharraf forced US officials to turn to civilian opposition to see if
they could calm the situation. A genuine coalition between Benazir
Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Nawaz Sharif's Muslim League
Party (PML-Q) could have provided a workable alternative to the military
dictatorship. Bhutto's arrival procession on October 18 2007 demonstrated
the strength of her Pakistan Peoples Party, as did the quarter of a
million loyal and enthusiastic supporters who went to Karachi to greet
her. But the bomb blasts, which killed 140 of them, showed her enemies to
be equally fervent. However, Bhutto’s estranged niece, Fatima Bhutto, who
held Benazir Bhutto morally responsible for the death of her father
Murtaza, was especially scalding in her criticism. Fatima Bhutto argued
that hard-won progress in grass-roots democracy would be jeopardised by
Benazir, who was giving democracy a bad name with her pro-American agenda.
“She has put us all in danger of an Islamic backlash,” she said in an
interview. “I do believe Benazir is the most dangerous thing to happen to
this country.”(20)
The open backing that Bhutto received from the United States sealed
her fate. Many people saw General Musharraf’s backroom deal with Benazir
Bhutto — encouraged by Washington —as his latest attempt to buy time and
stay in office. However, Benazir Bhutto's assassination on 27th December
2007 and Musharraf's resignation in August 2008, led to the September
presidential election, and the victory of Asif Ali Zardari, Bhutto's
widower.
Since coming to power, Zardari and military leaders have
been struggling to control Islamist militants, many of whom are located in
the tribal areas adjacent to the border with Afghanistan, but increasingly
also inside Pakistan. In recent weeks, the Taliban group has repeatedly
threatened that if it faces intensified operations by the Pakistani armed
forces it will turn Pakistan into another Afghanistan. In other words, it
will topple the government and will establish an Islamic Emirate in
Pakistan. It remains to be seen whether the latest offensive against them
will totally defeat them or whether they will manage to recruit more
followers and pose a greater threat in the future. Afghanistan -
an account of its contemporary history
The recent problems in
Afghanistan, which by and large had enjoyed relative peace and stability
under Zahir Shah for four decades, from 1933 until 1973, started with his
removal in a bloodless coup by his cousin and former Prime Minister
Mohammed Daoud Khan. While Zahir Shah had remained staunchly independent,
refusing to join either the Western or the Soviet camps, Daoud Khan who
declared a republic tried to move closer to the West with the
encouragement of Mohammad Reza Shah of Iran. During a state visit to
Moscow in April 1977, Leonid Brezhnev told Khan that Afghanistan's
non-alignment was important to the USSR, and warned him about the presence
of experts from NATO countries stationed in the northern parts of
Afghanistan. The Western leanings of Daoud Khan incensed the leftist and
particularly communist parties in Afghanistan that staged a bloody coup in
April 1978 led by the Marxist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA). The rivalry between Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin led to
the assassination of the former and the harsh short-lived rule of the
latter, jeopardising Soviet interests in Afghanistan.
In December
1979, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan, instating Babrak Karmal, the
leader of the Parcham wing of the communist party, as the new Afghan
president. The event was described in cataclysmic terms by Western media,
and it was seen as a major threat to the West. It seemed that the whole of
the Middle East was about to slip out of Western control. President Jimmy
Carter issued his famous 'Carter Doctrine', proclaiming that the Persian
Gulf constituted a major area of vital US national interest and that the
US would defend it by all means necessary. However, what is not often
realised is what had brought the Soviet forces to Afghanistan in the first
place. According to some major Western players, Afghanistan was a trap
laid for the Soviet Union to do to it what Vietnam had done to America.
The United States provided massive military and financial assistance
to the religious fanatics, the Mujahedin (the Holy Warriors), in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the help of Saudi money and military
assistance from the Islamist government of General Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan
who had toppled the democratically elected government of Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto. The Soviet war in Afghanistan lasted for ten years with some
30,000 Soviet forces killed and tens of thousands wounded. Over two
million Afghans were also killed and another five million became refugees
in Iran and Pakistan and many others were made homeless inside
Afghanistan, and the country was devastated.
Yet, subsequently, we
have learned that there was more to that invasion than was initially
realised. Zbigniew Brzesinksi, national security adviser to President
Jimmy Carter, in a 1998 interview with Le Nouvel Observateur openly
admitted that the official story that the US gave military aid to the
Afghan opposition only after the Soviet invasion in 1979 was false. The
truth was, he said, that the US began aiding the Islamic fundamentalist
Mojahedin six months before the Russians made their move because, in his
words, "this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention."(21)
Brzesinksi was asked if he regretted this decision: "Regret what?
That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing
the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day
that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President
Carter: We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War.
Indeed, for almost ten years, Moscow had to carry on a war unsupportable
by the government, a conflict that brought about the demoralization and
finally the breakup of the Soviet empire."(22)
After the Soviet invasion, Brzezinski wrote to President Carter:
"This will require a review of our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees
to it, more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security policy
towards Pakistan cannot be dictated by our non-proliferation policy."(23)
Later, Brzezinski offered the explanation: "The question here was whether
it was morally acceptable that, in order to keep the Soviets off balance,
which was the reason for the operation, it was permissible to use other
lives for our geopolitical interests."(24)
Clearly, it was 'morally acceptable' to sacrifice millions of Afghans for
the sake of the United States' geopolitical gains.
Robert Gates,
the present defence secretary and the then director of the US Central
Intelligence Agency, wrote in a State Department report in 1979, months
before the Soviets rolled across the border to support the Taraki-Amin
regime: "Beginning early in 1979, the United States government began
considering providing covert support to the potential opposition in the
mujahideen in Afghanistan and, beginning in July, actually the president
authorised the kind of support…. The United States' larger interest… would
be served by the demise of the [pro-Soviet] Taraki-Amin regime, despite
whatever setbacks this might mean for future social and economic reforms
in Afghanistan."(25)
President Carter's CIA director Stansfield Turner wrote: "The
question here was whether it was morally acceptable that, in order to keep
the Soviets off balance, which was the reason for the operation, it was
permissible to use other lives for our geopolitical interests." He
answered the question: "I decided I could live with that."(26)
According to Representative Charles Wilson, a Texas Democrat,
"There were 58,000 dead in Vietnam and we owe the Russians one.... I have
a slight obsession with it, because of Vietnam. I thought the Soviets
ought to get a dose of it.... I've been of the opinion that this money was
better spent to hurt our adversaries than other money in the Defense
Department budget."(27)
When the Taliban took power, State Department spokesperson Glyn
Davies said that he saw "nothing objectionable" in the Taliban's plans to
impose strict Islamic law. Senator Hank Brown, chair of the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, welcomed the new
regime: "The good part of what has happened is that one of the factions at
last seems capable of developing a new government in Afghanistan."(28)
"The Taliban will probably develop like the Saudis. There will be Aramco,
pipelines, an emir, no parliament and lots of Sharia law. We can live with
that," said another U.S. diplomat in 1997.(29)
There was though a kind of method in the madness: Brzezinski hoped
not just to drive the Russians out of Afghanistan, but to ferment unrest
within the Soviet Union itself. His plan, says author Dilip Hiro, was "to
export a composite ideology of nationalism and Islam to the
Muslim-majority Central Asian states and Soviet Republics with a view to
destroying the Soviet order."(30)
Looking back in 1998, Brzezinski had no regrets. "What was more important
in the world view of history?... A few stirred-up Muslims or the
liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?"(31)
President Mohammad Najibullah, the last Afghan president before
the Mujahedin came to power (November 1986 - April 1992), made the
following prophetic statement to the reporters about the support given to
the Mujahedin and the Taliban: "If fundamentalism comes to Afghanistan,
war will continue for many years. Afghanistan will turn into a centre of
world smuggling for narcotic drugs. Afghanistan will be turned into a
centre for terrorism."(32)
His prediction proved all too accurate. On September 26, 1996, the
Taliban conquered Kabul. The first thing they did was to drag President
Najibullah and his brother from the UN compound where they had taken
refuge and hanged them in public. The next day they expelled 8,000 female
undergraduates from Kabul University and fired a similar number of women
schoolteachers.
Between 1982 and 1992, some 35,000 Muslim radicals
from 43 Islamic countries in the Middle East, North and East Africa,
Central Asia and the Far East would pass their baptism of fire with the
Afghan Mujahedin. Tens of thousands more foreign Muslim radicals joined
them. Eventually more than 100,000 Muslim radicals were to have direct
contact with Pakistan and Afghanistan and be influenced by the jihad
against the USSR. One group of these radicals was led by Osama bin-Ladin.
But as the Economist magazine noted soon after September 11, " [U.S.]
policies in Afghanistan a decade and more ago helped to create both Osama
bin Laden and the fundamentalist Taliban regime that shelters him."(33)
In 1998, the Taliban and a western oil consortium led by the U.S.
firm Unocal signed a major pipeline deal. It is sad that after so much
bloodshed in Iraq and Afghanistan the oil companies are back again. Five
major western oil companies, Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Shell, BP and Total are
about to sign U.S.-brokered no-bid contracts to begin exploiting Iraq’s
oil fields.(34)
Saddam Hussein nationalised Iraq’s oil industry in 1972, but the
U.S.-installed Baghdad regime is welcoming them back.
Afghanistan has just signed a major deal to launch a long-planned
1,680-km pipeline project expected to cost $8 billion.(35)
If completed, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline (TAPI)
will export gas and later oil from the Caspian basin to Pakistan’s coast
where tankers will transport it to the West. These short-term economic
gains will only store up more trouble for the future, as they are bound to
intensify resentment among the Iraqis and Afghans who will see the wars
that have been fought on their territories to have been for the sake of
access to oil and gas. Occupation - a major cause of
resentment
This short survey of the recent history in Afghanistan
and Pakistan shows that the issues are complex and deep-rooted and some of
them are due to short-sighted policies of various Western governments in
the past. The resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan poses
a major threat to both countries, but the removal of that threat cannot be
achieved by military force alone. In order to put an end to violence
and terrorism their causes should be removed. Occupation and the presence
of foreign troops in other countries are always major causes of
resentment, violence and bloodshed. Consequently, the region will only
find peace if U.S. and NATO forces withdraw, allowing the people in those
countries to decide their own fate.
Certainly, the immediate
aftermath of occupation is going to be ugly and messy as different groups
try to settle scores with their enemies and compete for power, but this is
inevitable no matter when foreign troops leave. However, the longer they
stay the more intense will be the subsequent conflict and bloodshed.
The United States should have left Afghanistan after having removed the
Taliban from power, if indeed there had not been other ways of resolving
the presence of al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan. Now, it is much more difficult
to do so than immediately after the fall of the Taliban, and in a few
years' time it will be even harder than now. Therefore, the sooner the
United States decides to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, as well as
from Iraq, the better.
The Afghans have lived together and with
their neighbours for thousands of years and have evolved a form of life
that best suits them, based on religious tolerance, hospitality,
generosity and fierce independence. People have forgotten that prior to
the Soviet invasion and the Western campaign to defeat the invaders the
Afghans were among the most peaceful and the most hospitable people in the
world. Afghanistan was a Mecca for Western backpackers who travelled to
Afghanistan in their thousands and received friendship and hospitality
from the Afghans. However, history has shown that when they have been
invaded they have been among the fiercest people intent on repelling the
invasion.
Many well-informed Western officials and observers have
also come to the same conclusion. Rory Stewart, who was an administrator
in southern Iraq, is angered by the arrogance and condescending attitude
of occupiers in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In an article in the New York
Times, he wrote: "Afghans and Iraqis are often genuinely courageous,
charming, generous, inventive and honourable. Their social structures have
survived centuries of poverty and foreign mischief and decades of war and
oppression, and have enabled them to overcome almost unimaginable trauma.
But to acknowledge this seems embarrassingly romantic or even patronising.
Yet the only chance of rebuilding Iraq or Afghanistan in the face of
insurgency or civil war is to identify, develop and use some of these
traditional values."(36)
If President Obama continues with his policy of 'surge' and
military campaigns in Afghanistan and Pakistan, part of the Pentagon's
"Long War" and President Bush's "War on Terror", he will face a situation
much worse than President Bush faced in Iraq. The ill-conceived policy
of the surge in Iraq and buying off nearly 100,000 former Sunni insurgents
with 300-dollar monthly payments was bound to backfire. That policy is
already unravelling, with April 2009 being one of the bloodiest months
since the surge began, with many attacks by the members of the so-called
Awakening Councils or Sons of Iraq against the Shi'i-dominated Iraqi
government resulting in hundreds of deaths. Violence has continued in the
month of May too. In Afghanistan, tribal and ethnic loyalties run deep
and it is unlikely that any form of payment would separate the so-called
moderate members of those clans from their kith and kin.
Pakistan
is a nation of over 170 million people, with a large group of militants
who have been radicalised as the result of the war against the Soviet
Union and later on the US invasion of Afghanistan. Afghanistan has always
proved hostile to its occupiers and the developments in the last seven
years show that the same spirit still persists. The continuation and
intensification of the wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan will gravely
weaken America, in the same way that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
put an end to the Soviet system.
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Possible solutions to the conflicts in
Afghanistan and Pakistan
A fundamental rethinking of Western
strategy is therefore urgently required. This could include:
*
Hold a regional conference. The problems of the greater Middle East
and South Asia can only be resolved on a regional basis. Therefore, it is
important that the West acknowledges the deep interests of the main
regional players who also seek stability in the region, and should involve
them in the solution of the conflict. Instability in Iraq and terrorism in
Pakistan and Afghanistan are of more immediate concern to the countries in
the region than they are to the West. Therefore, what is needed is to form
a meaningful peace conference with the participation of Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Iran, Russia, China and India, as well as of the
representatives from the West, under UN auspices. It is only through local
solutions reached by all these countries through dialogue and consultation
that any arrangement can have a lasting effect in settling the issues of
terrorism and insurgency. Any unilateral imposition of ill-conceived
designs by the West would only prolong the tragedy. The history of the
past one hundred years of meddling in the affairs of the region, with
tragic consequences, should have taught us this fundamental lesson if
nothing else.
* Declare a unilateral ceasefire. Seven
years of fighting should have been enough to show that there is no
military solution to the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A brave
gesture of reconciliation, telling the Afghans and Pakistanis that US
forces will be leaving by a set date in the near future can win back many
more moderate elements who have been alienated. This, combined with the
announcement of a regional conference aimed at peace and reconciliation,
could encourage more moderate elements in the region to look for a
peaceful settlement of the conflicts.
* Start negotiations with
the Taliban and the Pashtuns. As a part of this process, there should
be political negotiations with the Taliban and with Pashtun tribes in both
Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the aim of separating them from al-Qaida.
While most Pashtuns are warlike and fiercely independent, there is no
reason to believe that most of them would support al-Qaida, which is
mainly a foreign organisation dominated by Wahhabi Arabs. It should be
also borne in mind that the Taliban was not a native product of
Afghanistan. It was imposed on Afghanistan by Pakistan, with US support.
It is believed that nearly half of the Taliban forces that initially
conquered Kabul were made up of regular Pakistani forces. Many Afghans do
not agree with the Taliban's harsh and fundamentalist interpretations of
Islam. In fact, the traditional form of Islam in Afghanistan has been mild
and moderate with strong mystical leanings. Their tentative support for
the Taliban is partly due to their opposition to the presence of foreign
forces in their country.
Equally, if the Pashtuns were left to
themselves they would return to their old ways of independence based on
their tribal loyalties. The introduction of Western-style democracy is not
something that can be imposed on them by force. Democracy is not a product
but a process. It is something that can grow as the result of education
and greater integration with the outside world. Initially, a resolution of
the situation in Afghanistan would require guaranteeing the autonomy of
the tribal areas, under a loose form of federation and a symbolic central
government, which has been the pattern in Afghanistan's history.
* Resolve the Kashmir problem. The West should help resolve the
Kashmir problem and bring about reconciliation between India and Pakistan.
If the Indo-Pakistani tension and the ever-present threat of war subside,
Pakistan can devote her energies to making a better life for its citizens.
There have been three wars between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and
another war could involve the use of nuclear weapons. There have been
several attempts at finding a peaceful solution to the issue of Kashmir
and at times they seemed tantalising close. General Musharraf was open to
a deal that would entail the notion of 'soft borders' and separate
autonomy for the two parts of Kashmir.(37)
However, India has been dragging its feet due to security considerations.
The resolution of Kashmir problem would remove a major cause of terrorism
and would ensure a lasting peace between India and Pakistan.
*
Provide bread not guns. While putting an end to its military presence,
the West should provide substantial financial subsidies to the Afghans in
reparation for the enormous damage that has been done to them both during
the war against the Soviet invasion, as well as during the subsequent US
invasion. Afghanistan is now one of the poorest countries in the world,
with a shattered economy and almost non-existent infrastructure, like
roads, hospitals, schools and factories. The unemployment rate is
estimated to exceed 50 per cent. Pakistan also needs huge economic
subsidies, not military assistance. The West should make sure that the
assistance that is provided is spent on education, health care and social
services, rather than on maintaining an inflated and corrupt military
establishment. The best guarantee against extremism and radicalism is the
hope of a better future and prospects of jobs and security.
* Build
modern schools instead of religious madrasas. Pakistan is still a
mainly rural country with more than 64 per cent of the population living
in villages. Less than half of the population can either read or write,
while girls’ enrolment is among the lowest in the world, lagging behind
Ethiopia and Yemen. One in three school-age Pakistani children does not
attend school, and many of those who do, attend madrasas that offer almost
no instruction beyond the memorising of the Koran, thus creating a large
pool of volunteers for militant Islam. The madrasas mushroomed under
General Zia ul-Haq who, as a part of an American-supported policy,
established many madrasas mainly with Saudi money to train Islamic
fighters against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. These measures would go
much further to putting an end to radical Islamism than any military
campaigns.
* Stop drone attacks. The most immediate step that
the US government must take is to put an end to drone attacks in Pakistan.
Even the top adviser to the US army chief in Afghanistan, David Kilcullen,
has observed that the US drone strikes in Pakistan are creating more
enemies than eliminating them, hence the need to have them "called off."(38)
The impersonality of the drones and the large number of casualties that
result alienate and infuriate most Pakistanis. Pakistani leaders have
repeatedly condemned these attacks and have called on the United States to
stop them. Their inability to change US behaviour further humiliates and
enrages the public and turns them against their own government.
Beware of a massive volcano
Shortly after the Iranian revolution
that unexpectedly brought many disparate anti-Shah and anti-American
forces together and resulted in an unstoppable revolution against one of
the most powerful and most stables governments in the Middle East,
Stansfield Turner, the former Director of the CIA, wrote: "What we didn't
predict was a 78-year-old-man, an Ayatollah, who had spent 14 years in
exile, uniting these forces and turning all these volcanos into one
immense volcano; into a national and real revolution."(39)
As the wars that are raging in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Palestine,
Somalia, and now Pakistan and elsewhere are intensifying anti-Western
feelings among a large section of the public in those countries, we must
beware lest those aroused masses come together and create a volcano beyond
anything that we can imagine.
What the world hopes to see under
President Obama is a radical shift away from militarism and foreign
adventures to peaceful resolutions of conflicts all over the world. There
should be a paradigm shift away from a military-dominated outlook to one
based on old-fashioned diplomacy, and a policy of winning hearts and
minds. At the moment, the budgets of the Pentagon, CIA and other
intelligence and military organisations dwarf the budget of the State
Department and foreign aid. There should be a reversal of this balance.
With the economic problems that the United States is facing she cannot
continue to be the sole gendarme of the world and bear the cost of running
the largest empire that has ever existed. America cannot go on spending as
much on its military as the rest of the world put together. The
neoconservative dream of world domination and unilateralism has turned
into a nightmare. It is time to admit the folly of trying to establish
global hegemony and to return to what America does best, the championship
of democracy, human rights, freedom and openness. These values cannot be
taught at the barrel of a gun. A genuine multilateralism will not only
help put an end to many conflicts in the world, it will also turn the
United States into a beacon of hope for humanity and a major player in the
advancement of democracy. The United States is the only country that
can either destroy the world, or can remake the world with its power of
idealism, energy and passionate belief in freedom and democracy.
Footnotes
1- Tariq Ali, The Duel:
Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power (Simon & Schuster Ltd,
2008), p 224 2-
http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/thatseemsfair/latimes0173.html
3- See
http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2009/05/05-7 4- ibid 5- See
http://news.antiwar.com/2009/05/06/us-strikes-in-afghanistan-kill-100-mostly-civilians/
6- See BBC report:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8069467.stm, and CNN
report
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/05/27/lahore.blast/index.html
7- See Arundhati Roy "The monster in India's mirror", Asia Times, Dec 16,
2008,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/south_asia/jl16df02.html 8- See "9 Is
Not 11", by Arundhati Roy, TomDispatch.com, December 12, 2008,
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175013 9- See "Civilian deaths a
flash point in Afghanistan" by Dexter Filkins, New York Times, November 8,
2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/world/asia/18iht-afghan.1.20273614.html?scp=7&sq=Civilians%20killed%20in%20Afghanistan&st=cse
10- See "Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq", Unknown News
http://www.unknownnews.net/casualties.html 11- See "Aides Say
Obama’s Afghan Aims Elevate War" by Helene Cooper and Thom Shanker,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/28/us/politics/28policy.html?scp=1&sq=President%20Obama%20tougher%20line%20on%20Afghanistan&st=cse
12- ibid 13- See "Struggle ahead for Afghanistan" by Paul Fitzgerald
and Elizabeth Gould, Boston Globe, July 30, 2008,
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2008/07/30/struggle_ahead_for_afghanistan/
14- See End of Imaginary Durand Line,
http://www.afghanland.com/history/durrand.html 15- See Pakistan's
Assertive Regional Strategy, September 12,1994,
http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1994/940912.htm, also February 1,
1993,
http://www.kashmir-information.com/Afghanistan/Appendix2.html 16-
See "Tribes of Terror" The Claremont Institute for the Study of
Statesmanship and Political Philosophy, Winter 2007,
http://www.claremont.org/publications/crb/id.1507/article_detail.asp
17- See "Bhutto’s Return Brings Pakistani Politics to a Boil", New York
Times, October 30, 2007
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/30/world/asia/30pakistan.html?_r=2&th=&emc=th&pagewanted=all
18- See "Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinsk" from Le Nouvel Observateur,
January 15-21, 1998, p. 76,
http://www.kersplebedeb.com/mystuff/s11/brzezinski.html 19- See
"Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinsk" from Le Nouvel Observateur, January
15-21, 1998, p. 76,
http://www.kersplebedeb.com/mystuff/s11/brzezinski.html 20- See
"Context of 'December 26, 1979: Memo to President Carter Gives Pakistan
Green Light to Pursue Nuclear Weapons Program", History Commons,
http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a122679memotocarter
21- See "Afghanistan, the CIA, bin Laden, and the Taliban" by Phil Gasper,
International Socialist Review, November-December 2001,
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_CIA_Taliban.html
22- See "Superpowers' 'mistakes' in Afghanistan", BBC News, 24 December,
2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4112117.stm 23- See
"Afghanistan, the CIA, bin Laden, and the Taliban", by Phil Gasper,
International Socialist Review, November-December 2001,
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_CIA_Taliban.html
24- See Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War
II, By William Blum, "Afghanistan 1979-1992"
http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51/100.html 25- See
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article9040.htm 26- ibid
27- See "The Cost of an Afghan Victory" by Dilip Hiro; The Nation, Vol.
268, February 15, 1999.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/19990215/hiro 28- Quoted by Andrew
Hartman, "The Red Template: US Policy in Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan,"
Third World Quarterly 23, no. 3 (2002): 482. 29- See "End the War in
Afghanistan", April 24, 2009, Ceasefire.ca,
http://www.ceasefire.ca/?p=1090
30- Quoted in "Afghanistan, the CIA, bin Laden and the Taliban" By Phil
Gasper, International Socialist Review
http://www.isreview.org/issues/20/CIA_binladen_afghan.shtml 31- See
"Oil giants return to Iraq" by Patrick Cockburn, The Independent, Friday,
20 June 2008:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/oil-giants-return-to-iraq-851036.html
32- See "At Last, Some Truth About Iraq and Afghanistan" by Eric Margolis
June 24, 2008, LewRockwell.com,
http://www.lewrockwell.com/margolis/margolis114.html 33- New York
Times, March 7, 2007,
http://select.nytimes.com/2007/03/07/opinion/07stewart.html?scp=4&sq=Rory%20Stewart&st=cse
34- See: "Now is the time for a deal on Kashmir" by Jonathan Power, TFF,
May 26, 2009,
http://www.transnational.org/Columns_Power/2009/21.Kashmir.html 35-
See "Advisor: ‘US Needs to Call off Drone Strikes in Pak’", Asia News
International, 3rd May 2009
http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2009/05/03-1 36- Quoted in
"Looking back at Iran's revolution", BBC News, 11 February, 2002:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1814141.stm
Tariq Ali, The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power
(Simon & Schuster Ltd, 2008), p 224
http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/thatseemsfair/latimes0173.html
See
http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2009/05/05-7
ibid
See
http://news.antiwar.com/2009/05/06/us-strikes-in-afghanistan-kill-100-mostly-civilians/
See BBC report:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8069467.stm, and CNN
report
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/05/27/lahore.blast/index.html
See Arundhati Roy "The monster in India's mirror", Asia Times, Dec 16,
2008,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/south_asia/jl16df02.html
See "9 Is Not 11", by Arundhati Roy, TomDispatch.com, December 12,
2008,
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175013
See "Civilian deaths a flash point in Afghanistan" by Dexter Filkins,
New York Times, November 8, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/world/asia/18iht-afghan.1.20273614.html?scp=7&sq=Civilians%20killed%20in%20Afghanistan&st=cse
See "Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq", Unknown News
http://www.unknownnews.net/casualties.html
See "Aides Say Obama’s Afghan Aims Elevate War" by HELENE COOPER and
THOM SHANKER,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/28/us/politics/28policy.html?scp=1&sq=President%20Obama%20tougher%20line%20on%20Afghanistan&st=cse
ibid
See "Struggle ahead for Afghanistan" by Paul Fitzgerald and Elizabeth
Gould, Boston Globe, July 30, 2008,
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2008/07/30/struggle_ahead_for_afghanistan/
See End of Imaginary Durand Line,
http://www.afghanland.com/history/durrand.html
See Pakistan's Assertive Regional Strategy, September 12,1994,
http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1994/940912.htm, also February 1,
1993,
http://www.kashmir-information.com/Afghanistan/Appendix2.html
See "Tribes of Terror" The Claremont Institute for the Study of
Statesmanship and Political Philosophy, Winter 2007,
http://www.claremont.org/publications/crb/id.1507/article_detail.asp
See "Bhutto’s Return Brings Pakistani Politics to a Boil", New York
Times, October 30, 2007
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/30/world/asia/30pakistan.html?_r=2&th=&emc=th&pagewanted=all
See "Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinsk" from Le Nouvel Observateur,
January 15-21, 1998, p. 76,
http://www.kersplebedeb.com/mystuff/s11/brzezinski.html
See "Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinsk" from Le Nouvel Observateur,
January 15-21, 1998, p. 76,
http://www.kersplebedeb.com/mystuff/s11/brzezinski.html
See "Context of 'December 26, 1979: Memo to President Carter Gives
Pakistan Green Light to Pursue Nuclear Weapons Program", History Commons,
http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a122679memotocarter
See "Afghanistan, the CIA, bin Laden, and the Taliban" by Phil Gasper,
International Socialist Review, November-December 2001,
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_CIA_Taliban.html
See "Superpowers' 'mistakes' in Afghanistan", BBC News, 24 December,
2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4112117.stm
See "Afghanistan, the CIA, bin Laden, and the Taliban", by Phil
Gasper, International Socialist Review, November-December 2001,
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_CIA_Taliban.html
See Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War
II, By William Blum, "Afghanistan 1979-1992"
http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51/100.html
See
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article9040.htm
ibid
See "The Cost of an Afghan Victory" by Dilip Hiro; The Nation, Vol.
268, February 15, 1999.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/19990215/hiro
Quoted by Andrew Hartman, "The Red Template: US Policy in
Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan," Third World Quarterly 23, no. 3 (2002): 482.
See "End the War in Afghanistan", April 24, 2009, Ceasefire.ca,
http://www.ceasefire.ca/?p=1090
Quoted in "Afghanistan, the CIA, bin Laden and the Taliban" By Phil
Gasper, International Socialist Review
http://www.isreview.org/issues/20/CIA_binladen_afghan.shtml
See "Oil giants return to Iraq" by Patrick Cockburn, The Independent,
Friday, 20 June 2008:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/oil-giants-return-to-iraq-851036.html
See "At Last, Some Truth About Iraq and Afghanistan" by Eric Margolis
June 24, 2008, LewRockwell.com,
http://www.lewrockwell.com/margolis/margolis114.html
New York Times, March 7, 2007,
http://select.nytimes.com/2007/03/07/opinion/07stewart.html?scp=4&sq=Rory%20Stewart&st=cse
See: "Now is the time for a deal on Kashmir" by Jonathan Power, TFF,
May 26, 2009,
http://www.transnational.org/Columns_Power/2009/21.Kashmir.html
See "Advisor: ‘US Needs to Call off Drone Strikes in Pak’", Asia News
International, 3rd May 2009
http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2009/05/03-1
Quoted in "Looking back at Iran's revolution", BBC News, 11 February,
2002:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1814141.stm This
article was first published at:
http://www.transnational.org/Resources_Treasures/2009/Jahanpour_AfPak.html
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