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Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the
Surrender of Japan
By Tsuyoshi Hasegawa
A Book Review By Jim Miles
Belknap Press, Harvard University, 2005
ccun.org, September 3, 2008
The end of the Second World War with Japan is a story of the clashes
of three empires – the struggling Soviets, the decline of the
Japanese, and the ascendancy of the American. The common media
perception is that the use of the atomic bombs ended the war, and
while that is part of the picture, it misses several other nuances
that played critical roles in the ending of the war. Tsuyoshi
Hasegawa in his work Racing the Enemy provides a history of the
critical months of the summer of 1945 that demonstrates the
culpability of all three empires leading to the use of these weapons
of mass destruction. It also serves as a story of the
empirical elites working towards their own advantage, regardless of
outcomes for others.
It is the idea of the atomic bomb itself that creates an unusual
image of immense destruction, as the U.S., Britain, and Germany had
all used mass carpet bombings to try and force the opposition to
quit the war. The overall result in all affected areas was a
stiffening resolve against the perpetrators of the other side (a
lesson not yet learned in Iraq and Afghanistan). Incendiary
bombings had already obliterated several cities and hundreds of
thousands of lives before the atomic bomb became operational
(Dresden, Hamburg, Tokyo). According to Hasegawa, while the
Japanese were impressed by the power of the bomb, its actual
destructiveness and its threatening power were not the main reasons
for ending the war.
Hasegawa’s picture of the summer of 1945 is one of manipulations and
deceit involving all three parties, with very few of the motives
being altruistic and humanitarian but rather mostly geopolitical.
The triangulations of power involved the expected entry of the
Soviet forces into the war with Japan, a concept that the Japanese
remained out of tune with real Soviet intentions until the end.
It also involved American concerns about Soviet power and the
occupation of Japan’s northern island of Hokkaido, although there
were only minimal concerns about the Soviet occupation of the
Southern Kurils as was agreed to in principle at the Yalta
conference.
The main American concerns for the war was the possible necessity of
having to invade the mainland and the probable entry of the Soviets
into the war that would add complications to both post war
occupation and treaties, as well as geopolitical concerns for the
future. Along with all this was the ongoing development of the
atomic bomb.
Thus Hasegawa’s title stands clearly defined. He presents a
story that clearly shows the three combatants trying to ‘race’ each
other to a conclusion of the war that satisfied one or more of their
own major concerns. As it was, none of the three escape
criticism for actually extending the war, as the race involved
purposeful roadblocks along the way as one side or the other tried
to manipulate the situation in their favour – not surprising in a
war, but not normally as well defined in history texts either.
The ‘story’ is finely told, and unlike many history texts provides a
compelling narrative that includes much anecdotal material from
diaries and war records on all three sides of the conflict. It
remains an academic history, the story of the elite policy makers
and how their decisions reflect more the future geopolitical needs
of the respective countries/empires than concerns for any citizens
in harms way.
Most critical to the discussion is Hasagawa’s presentation of the
Potsdam ultimatum. First, the ultimatum was not
delivered through diplomatic channels (i.e. using the neutrality of
Sweden and Switzerland to deliver the message) and “was issued as
propaganda through the Office of War information.” Truman’s
citation of newspaper editorials does not serve as proof of the
“prompt rejection” of the ultimatum by the Japanese rulers, or “that
the reaction of the Japanese government was entirely different from
what Radio Tokyo had reported” as the government was divided as how
to approach the issue. Rather, the Japanese reception was to
reserve comment on the ultimatum, “that the Japanese government
suspended judgment on the Potsdam ultimatum.”
The ultimatum did not include any message about one of the
over-riding concerns of the rulers of Japan that the Imperial house
be preserved (a natural response of self preservation for all
‘supreme’ rulers). There is considerable discussion on this
issue, with Hasagawa’s focus being that Truman needed and indeed
wanted the Potsdam ultimatum to be rejected in order to use the
atomic weapons:
one cannot escape the conclusion that the United States rushed to
drop the bomb without any attempt to explore the readiness of some
Japanese policymakers to seek peace through the ultimatum.
Why the rush? In Hasagawa’s interpretation the bomb
represented a solution to three dilemmas faced by Truman:
“unconditional surrender, the cost of Japan’s homeland invasion, and
Soviet entry into the war.” The bomb itself did not solve any
of these issues, but Truman’s temporary jubilance at its success was
“because of the satisfaction that everything had gone as he had
planned.”
Japan’s reaction was in a sense under whelming. Already
subject to fierce fire bombings that had killed hundreds of
thousands of civilians, the bomb “did not lead to their decision to
accept the Potsdam terms…[but] further contributed to their
desperate efforts to terminate the war through Moscow’s mediation….
Indeed, Soviet attack, not the Hiroshima bomb, convinced political
leaders to end the war by accepting the Potsdam declaration.”
While the Potsdam ultimatum receives some of Hasagawa’s strongest
critique, his conclusion finds all parties guilty for delaying the
war even further than had been necessary. Truman “needed
Japan’s refusal to justify the use of the atomic bomb…thus…he could
not include the provision providing a constitutional monarchy” in
the ultimatum. The Soviets continually misled the
Japanese as to their intentions concerning the Neutrality Pact
between the two, and “Ironically, both Stalin and Truman had vested
interests in keeping unconditional surrender [no monarchy] for
different reasons.” While the two atomic bombs alone “would
most likely not have prompted the Japanese to surrender…the war most
likely would have ended shortly after Soviet entry into the war –
before November 1.”
Overall, while there were alternatives available to all three sides
that could have allowed the war to terminate sooner without the use
of the atomic bombs, political concerns, rather than military ones
(or concerns about civilian deaths) carried the weight in the
decisions. While the use of the atomic bomb can be seen as an
atrocity, it is an atrocity that is not greater than the fire
bombings on all sides, of the war crimes committed by the Japanese
in China and Korea and other theatres of operation. While
decisions by the Soviets and the Americans could have ended the war
sooner without the catastrophe of using atomic weapons, Hasagawa
lays the main blame on the Japanese policymakers who “must bear the
responsibility for the war’s destructive end more than the American
president and the Soviet dictator.”
While this is truly history now, not current events, its
ramifications are obvious for our current world situation. The
Japanese still have not resolved their war crimes issues with China.
Japan’s ‘defence’ forces are among the world’s largest military
forces, and even with a ‘peace’ constitution, Japan has enough
plutonium – and the technology - available to make dozens of nuclear
warheads and their delivery. The issue of the Kuril Islands still
interferes with Russian-Japanese politics, even after the
dissolution of the Soviet empire. The Americans in some
respects still occupy Japan after sixty years, with Japan a nominal
independent and democratic country.
In an even broader perspective, the narrative of war, this war or
any other, as presented by historians at the political-strategic
level clearly demonstrates how empires are about power and control
of heartlands and hinterlands regardless of the wishes of the
majority of citizens. Those same citizens unfortunately are
subject to ongoing propaganda in the form of out and out rhetoric
and uber-patriotism, combined with the more nuanced propaganda from
the education systems and dominant media of their respective elites.
The current geopolitical struggles of the world over the oil and
strategic importance of the Middle East and Central Asia continues
this pattern. Our societies are now determined by our access
to formerly cheap oil; the military relies on that oil for their
dominance over other players; the elites wish to retain their hold
on power, their hold on the resources of the world for their own
benefit. The narrative continues, an ongoing history
punctuated by dates of conflict that are truly a series of
encounters for empires to control and dominate other people and
their resources.
To bring this back from that philosophical tangent, Hasagawa’s
interpretations should be a must read for anyone interested in how
the final acts of the Second World War set the stage for our current
geopolitical encounters. In reality, the American empire, the
Russians, Chinese, and Indians are still Racing the Enemy in an
ongoing battle for the world’s resources.
Jim Miles is a Canadian educator and a regular
contributor/columnist of opinion pieces and book reviews for The
Palestine Chronicle. Miles’ work is also presented globally
through other alternative websites and news publications.
jmiles50@telus.net
www.jim.secretcove.ca/index.Publications.html
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