1. A shift from military confrontation with the Taliban to political inclusion and reconciliation with them, or with the greatest possible share of their political base, is sounding increasingly plausible: attempts in that direction are currently being made, and it's virtually become the talk of the town (see the expulsion of the two British diplomats in January). The Taliban had been unfairly demonized and turned into bogeymen by being lumped with Al Qaeda in 2001. The Taliban basically represent the fanatical element within the tribes, which has always been part of the political equation in Afghanistan. 

 

2. Rather than calling for more brigades to be poured into the cauldron, or for launching military operations into Pakistan, the existing forces should be reined in; military operations, as far as possible, should be curtailed; outposts should be dismantled, etc. Detention centers should be emptied. Troop levels should be reduced. There should be a general draw-down: the military, the private security services, the diplomatic and advisory footprints, with their following of adventurers and carpetbaggers who gobble up most of the aid, should all be made smaller. The clear message should be that the foreigners are NOT planning to stay in Afghanistan forever--contrary to some demented statements about this being a fight for decades or generations.

 

This is the real heart of the matter, the most urgent and important thing to attend to, as Obama, possibly wary of being tarred as a foreign policy wimp, has been disastrously advocating more troops. 

 

If not rectified, it could become his Bay of Pigs.

 

Perhaps he could balance some restraint in adding troops to Afghanistan with moderation in withdrawing them from Iraq, in view of the different situation which has been developing there. As it is, he's also risking being left a bit out on a limb on Iraq, I think.

 

3. The above can work only if accompanied by appropriate political initiatives, which Afghans--not foreigners-- will have to hammer out and implement. Karzai himself is too compromised as a puppet. The question for those who are willing to help Afghanistan is to identify the right Afghans to work with, in a spirit of sincere respect and humble cooperation. I would suggest seeking out people within nationalist circles, and linking up with them: and listen very carefully to what they say. The objective should be to identify someone whose advice you can trust.

 

4. When speaking of the nationalist element, I'm actually using the word as shorthand for the network of political alliances centered on the royal family, which is now represented by the cousins of the late king. They are unsurpassed in managing the tribes, which were their base of power. They bridge the western educated, modernizing  elements and the traditional tribal leadership, and this is their great strength.

 

5. I'm not a monarchist, and neither are they.

 

6. Karzai has already had to reach out to them for support, and several are now in his cabinet. I would discreetly start from there.

 

7.  Given the state of grave national emergency, the calling of a Loya Jirga or grand national assembly, analogous to the one botched in 2002, would be very much in keeping with Afghan political tradition, and appropriate for trying to find some answers to the current political crisis. It might be planned for the end of Karzai's presidential mandate next year, possibly in lieu of the so-called presidential elections scheduled for 2009. Such an assembly or Jirga would be open to all, and hopefully accompanied by a ceasefire. It is impossible to be more specific at this point. It could be a convenient venue for thanking Karzai for his great services to the Fatherland, and wishing him a happy retirement. 

 

Who will replace him? It depends on how the jirga will be organized and conducted, by Afghans and for Afghans, and it's basically too early to say. This time, it should really be for the Afghans, not the foreigners, to decide.

 

8. There will naturally have to be some redistribution of power, in favor of the majority Pashtun element, which has been unfairly disenfranchised since the American invasion, and to the detriment of the hodgepodge of groups used to topple the Taliban in 2001. It is worth recalling that the map of  the insurgency coincides exactly with Pashtun ethnic areas. More than anything, this is a Pashtun tribal insurrection to expel the foreigners and regain their rightful primacy over the country, which they lost in 2001 merely because the Taliban happened to be Pashtun. So the Northern Alliance and various other warlords empowered by the Americans will inevitably be on the losing side, and thus in opposition. 

 

These murderous warlords have been tolerated long enough. If necessary, they would provide better targets for military power than the tribes. But I don't think it will actually come to that, provided they realize that the game is up.

 

9. I could not be happier if the very first decision by President Obama, on 21 Jan. 2009, were the announcement that all Guantanamo prisoners are to be immediately set free, except the 16 high-value detainees, the latter to be immediately transferred to the constitutional justice system. That would truly be a shot heard around the world. I can almost hear the great collective sigh of relief, worldwide. And it would be the best possible start for the reconciliation which is needed in so many places, after the delirious Bush years.

 

10. The Pakistan election results are great. There, too, the buzzword is inclusion: Zardari just called for it. The army and the people are tired of killing fellow Muslims for the benefit of the Americans (recruitment into the army, which used to be one of the most sought-after careers, has collapsed). Needless to say, this makes the militaristic approach in Afghanistan even less of an option. 

 

Election results are very favorable in the North-West Frontier as well. The religious parties, susceptible to give the Taliban some strategic depth, have been booted out, while the National Awami Party, which won the election there, and is Pashtun nationalist, has also declared that "We must sit with [the Taleban], we must talk to them" (BBC Feb. 14).

 

11. Most countries in the region are likely to be very supportive of a peace initiative, and it would be useful to take them on board, as appropriate, particularly since they all tend to have their own interests and favorites in Afghanistan. For example, Iran supports the Hazara Shura, traditional enemies of the Pashtun. But I think that everybody--the Iranians, the Chinese, Putin and the former Soviet republics--will be more than happy to see the US out of Central Asia. Even India should not really mind, because, with the US out of the region, its relative weight will be greater. They might grumble pro forma just a little bit, as traditional patrons of the Northern Alliance.

 

NATO will be ecstatic at no longer having to fight for purely American objectives.