Why rise in militancy in Pakistan?

By Abdullah M. Adnan

ccun.org, February 2, 2008

 
Militancy is on the rise in Pakistan, no doubt, but its causes are either not explored, for vested interests, or simply ignored, for expediency. While rulers in the country and the U.S.-led international community voice great concern over the spread of this menace, it appears that both are merely playing on each other’s weaknesses and sensitivities.
 
Military rule and the War on Terror are the two main culprits for the rise of militancy in Pakistan, pure and simple. A third, dictator-foreign nexus serves to add fuel to fire.
 
Militancy surges under military rule. By putting restrictions on genuine political activity, dictatorial rule shuts doors on peaceful means of expression – on dissent and differing views. It attempts to establish its writ by sheer use of force, and in response, or reaction, it gives rise to an urge among different segments of society to advance their cause through strong-arm tactics. In this vein, militancy is not restricted to ‘militants’ only, but becomes an attitude among many.
 
Whereas Islamic and religious political parties have been working for ‘Islamization’ in the country, they have not been much successful in this regard – neither in making the rulers accept their demands, nor in coming to power themselves. (Though they did make advances, formed a provincial government in 2002 elections, but never really shared power at the centre.) This ‘failure’ of the parties engaged in the political process in the democratic tradition, together with the ‘militarized’ government setup, gives cause and locus standi to those who are losely referred to as ‘local Taliban,’ and al-Qaeda-influenced elements – religious extremists, in short.
 
The Lal Masjid episode illustrates this problem. In meetings in April-May 2007, whenever I asked Abdul Rashid Ghazi about the legality and effectiveness of the methods employed by his students, he would always say, “Our struggle may be viewed as a natural alternative to the almost complete failure of religious political parties and their approach.” Referring to the MMA (Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal), he would say that the ruling elite would never meet their real demands – more than petty, peripheral issues (alluding to the issue of inclusion of religion column in the Pakistani passport).
 
Telling that “Lal Masjid has shown the way,” which “others will follow,” Mr. Ghazi (he was not a cleric but a university graduate and a former official of the United Nations) would inform me that he had just met delegates from various parts of the country. Toward the end, he would ‘assure’ me that it was a threat of use of force only, meaning thereby that it would not be resorted to. Hopefully, I thought.
 
In the end, to many at least, while the efforts to resolve the problem amicably were about to deliver, force was used by the government. This gave ‘extremists’ a further cause to go even more ruthlessly.
 
The second factor responsible for the rise of militancy is the U.S.-led war on terror – because Pakistan’s neighbourhood area is a hot battlefield in this war.
 
There is a widespread resentment against the U.S. military invasion of Afghanistan. The public at large feels that that the U.S. invaded a ‘sovereign Muslim’ country on flimsy grounds, i.e. on the pretext that it gave refuge to suspect-planner of the 9/11 havoc, Osama bin Laden, without first establishing his guilt. They also hold that the ‘Islamic’ government of Taliban had offered to hand over Osama to a third country, or a group of countries, or to the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference). While the U.S. did not bother to go the legal course, Pakistani rulers – in fact, one military man occupying power – plunged the country into this U.S. war. After meeting some U.S. officials, he came out convinced of Osama’s guilt!
 
Similarly, they view the U.S. invasion of Iraq as illegal and an act of ruthlessness. The U.S. could not find any WMDs there, nor could move the U.N. to sanction military action against Iraq. It, nevertheless, attacked a ‘sovereign’ country unilaterally.
 
When the U.S. does not seem to bother about legal sophistications, its interests are targeted. The extremist appeal finds many ears.
 
Along with the military rule at home and a ‘foreign war’ on hitherto safe frontiers, the situation gets worse when the U.S. continues support to the military ruler while he gets everything to remain in power.
 
Pervez Musharraf held his military position far too long, and relinquished it only after getting himself ‘re-elected’ from the outgoing assembly. Then, he imposed emergency rule, dismissed Supreme Court judges including the Chief Justice, and amended the Constitution. Entrenching himself first, he announced holding of elections only afterwards.
 
To many, Pervez Musharraf could do all this because of the tacit support from Washington. This generates despondency among the weak-kneed, and militancy among the strong-armed. No room for reason!
 
People of Pakistan love their army, but they cannot approve of its meddling in politics. They have nothing against the U.S., or the West in general, but they cannot countenance its politically crucial political support to a military ruler and, in turn, his ‘unstinted’ support to an imposed war. They do not hate the U.S.; they are angry at certain policies on an administration.
 
Without playing favourites, the U.S.-led West has to be seen as sincerely championing the cause of democracy. An end to the dictator-foreign nexus may greatly help in controlling and bringing down the spiralling problem of militancy.
 
Abdullah M. Adnan is an Islamabad-based researcher and political analyst. abdullahmadnan@hotmail.com