The 'Other', Older Palestinian
Coup D'etat
By Nicola Nasser
ccun.org, December 6, 2008
Failing to substantiate for the President of the autonomous
Palestinian Authority (PA), Mahmoud Abbas, a credible "legal" basis to
extend his term from the Basic Law, which is the constitutional terms of
reference that govern the rotation of power and the renewal of the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of the PA, Abbas in his
capacity as the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) convened the rubber stamping Fatah
dominated Central Council (CC) of the PLO in the West Bank city of
Ramallah to elect him also President of the State of Palestine on
November 23.
The move could have been the last "constitutional"
resort to extend his term as PA president before it expires on January 9
next year in order to secure himself as the supreme "legitimate"
authority on Palestinian decision making in the context of the "make -
or break" bloody wrangling with the rival Hamas on the leadership of
the Palestinian national movement.
The symbolic position secures
his presidency for life in line with the "tradition" of his predecessor,
but without any constitutional stipulation to support it as the PLO
regulations lack even an official text of a presidential oath, an
embarrassing fact that threw his senior aides into a whirlwind of
frenzied last minute efforts to write down an oath for him to read out
on November 23.
The position has been vacant since the death of
late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in 2004. The PLO lawmakers in
exile withheld the position from Abbas because they were demanding a
separation between the PA presidency and the PLO chairmanship as a
precautionary measure lest Israeli tanks bulldoze away the PA as they
did in 2002 taking down with it the PLO, the internationally
recognized sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,
which legitimized the creation of the "Palestinian National Authority"
(PNA) in 1993 as a subsidiary reporting to the PLO.
Dropping
their demand was dictated by the rivalry with Hamas and the so far
failed Arab, mainly Egyptian, mediation efforts between the PLO and the
Islamic Resistance Movement to resolve the dual legitimacy crisis, which
resulted from the landslide electoral victory of Hamas in the January
2006 legislative election, a crisis that was exacerbated by the ensuing
Israeli U.S. siege into a bloody showdown that brought Hamas in June
2007 to be the de facto ruler of the Gaza Strip and at the same time
created the existing de facto separation with the PLO led West Bank.
Abbas' move was intended to pre-empt an expected vacuum in power
after announcement by Hamas that it would not recognize him as PA
president after January 9 while insisting on its opposition to holding
simultaneous early presidential and legislative elections before the
Hamas dominated Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)'s mandate
expires in January 2010. The League of Arab Nations had warned against
any vacuum in power in the Israeli occupied Palestinian territories in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which the league anticipates as a
realistic possibility that threatens to relieve Israel of legitimate
Palestinian negotiating partners and consequently of its obligations in
accordance with the U.S. sponsored Annapolis diplomatic process.
PLO commitment to the Annapolis understandings was a milestone that
vindicated Hamas fears and accusations that Abbas was leading and
pursuing an older political coup d'etat to deprive the Islamic movement
from its electoral victory and at the same time, for all practical and
realpolitic reasons, foreclosed Abbas' options to end what his
leadership condemns as Hamas' military coup d'etat in Gaza through
national dialogue or political mediation.
Commitment or
non-commitment to what the Quartet of the US, EU, UN and Russian
mediators in Middle East peace making described as the "Annapolis
Process" in a statement they released after their meeting in the
Egyptian Red Sea resort of Sharm el-Sheikh on November 8 has become the
terms of reference to make or break the Palestinian unity of ranks,
which has so far failed the Egyptian mediation efforts, the latest in a
series of national, Arab and non-Arab similar reconciliation endeavors.
The Annapolis conference, which was hosted by the United States in
Meryland on November 27, 2007 and attended by all members of the Arab
League, convened with much fanfare and re-launched the Palestinian
Israeli negotiations after a seven year interruption since the
collapse of the trilateral Camp David summit with the U.S. in 2000.
In Annapolis, Arab leaders and the Palestinian presidency were lured by
a promise of a Palestinian state by the end of 2008 and a wider Arab
Israeli peace process therafter, mainly on the Syrian track, to coexist
with the inter-Palestinian divide between the PLO and Hamas and to
grudgingly hide their bitter resentment of the U.S. Israeli threat of
siege, which had aborted Qatari, UAE, Saudi, Egyptian, Yemeni and other
Arab and non Arab mediation efforts to unify Palestinian ranks, as
well as two landmark inter Palestinian accords (the Cairo agreement in
2005 and the "national consensus accord," known as the "prisoners'
document" agreement the next year).
The Annapolis plan to
implement the first stage of the 2003 Road Map for a Palestinian
Israeli political settlement has built on two pillars, the first a
Palestinian Israeli security coordination that is solely and directly
monitored by three senior U.S. generals, namely James Jones, William
Fraser and Keith Dayton, and the second pillar is the inter
Palestinian divide between Ramallah and Gaza.
However, the
failure of the "Annapolis process" could be better proved by the unmet
deadline of 2008 and the un-honored promise of a Palestinian state, but
the two pillars nonetheless survived the failure of Annapolis so far to
perpetuate and exacerbate the Palestinian rift, with the security
coordination raising accusations by Hamas of PLO collaboration with
Israel and the divide developing into what threatens to become a
permanent separation between the West Bank and Gaza.
There
remain too at the core of the Annapolis process and at the heart of the
Palestinian divide the three Israeli U.S. "good conduct" preconditions
that qualify Palestinians to be partners to peace negotiations as well
as to evade military siege, economic blockade and diplomatic isolation,
namely to unilaterally renounce violence without any guarantees of
Israeli reciprocity, recognize the existence of the state of Israel
without any Israeli reciprocal recognition of the state of Palestine,
and commitment to the accords signed by the PLO with Israel regardless
of Israeli reciprocal respect thereto.
Israel's lack of
reciprocity has come recently under spotlight by the refusal of the U.S.
State Department to publish a report by its Middle East security envoy
General James Jones on Palestinian Israeli security, which the Israeli
newspaper Haaretz, quoted by AFP on November 26, described in August as
"an extremely critical report of Israel's policies" in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip."
It is now public knowledge that the Palestinian
partner to the Annapolis process, represented by President Abbas, the
PLO and the PA, are wholeheartedly committed thereto irrespective of any
Israeli reciprocity. The emergency meeting of the Arab foreign ministers
in Cairo on November 26 concluded similarly committal, encouraged
beforehand to let go the undelivered promises of the Annapolis
conference by indications floated by both the Israeli President Shimon
Peres and the U.S. President elect Barak Obama's team of their
willingness to deal with the collective Arab peace initiative.
Hamas is consequently left in the cold to fend off a Palestinian and
Arab diplomatic isolation as much as to survive the Israeli ongoing
economic blockade and military siege, "hopefully" to gradually be
finished off or alternatively to surrender to those same three
preconditions to which its Palestinian rival had subscribed to as early
as the Oslo accord was signed with Israel in Washington D.C. in 1993.
More out of presuming the weakness of Hamas than out of feeling a
strength in his own position, but stiffening his back with the U.S. and
Israeli determination to push hard with their three pre-qualifications,
President Abbas feels safe enough to persistently reiterate his
commitment to Annapolis and to corner the besieged Islamic movement to
either dismantle voluntarily or otherwise being swept away in a way or
another, and he is on record as saying recently that the end of
the "black coup d'etat" in Gaza is only a matter of time.
However the end game of the Annapolis process is still far away from
being the only game in the town as it is held hostage to Hamas' fate as
much as it has cornered Hamas, but meanwhile this process remains the
detrimental factor that makes or breaks the unity of Palestinian ranks,
as long as both Palestinian protagonists continue to risk it out in
their brinkmanship policies.
President Abbas in a public speech
commemorating the forth anniversary of Arafat's death on November 11
reiterated his commitment to Annapolis, condemned the Hamas "black coup
d'etat" in 2007, and held Hamas responsible for the inter - Palestinian
political and geographical split with the West Bank as well as for the
failure of the "national dialogue" and the collapse of several Arab
mediation efforts to end the Palestinian divide.
Ironically,
Abbas' US led backers rarely use his "coup d'etat" label to describe
the violent Hamas showdown with the security forces loyal to him in Gaza
more than a year ago as they have their own labels, mostly derived from
terrorism, to exclude Hamas.
However, in retrospect Hamas "black
coup d'etat" in Gaza was in fact the result of a much wider, deeper and
older political and military coup d'etat that is still ongoing to
deprive Hamas from its democratically won victory in the legislative
elections of January 2006, pre-empt the repetition of that bitter
democratic process to guarantee by all means the exclusion of Hamas or
similar Palestinian political orientation, and to reinstate Israel's
Palestinian partner to the Oslo peace accord of 1993, namely the Abbas
led PLO and its autonomous PA in the West Bank, as the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people in any future Palestinian
elections, be it presidential, legislative or municipal.
The
anti Hamas coup d'etat began, First, when Israel and the United States
led an internationally - imposed collective punishment on the
Palestinian people, under Israeli occupation since 1967, by enforcing an
economic, financial, political and diplomatic siege on the Hamas-led
government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip immediately after the 2006
legislative election, which was facilitated by more than $220 million
U.S. and European taxpayers' money and brought Hamas to power in a
landslide electoral victory that stunned both the European Union and
United States donors to the democratic process and the Jimmy Carter
led international monitors who testified to the fair, free and
transparent elections.
Second, the U.S. sponsor who monopolizes
the peace making process in the Arab and Palestinian Israeli
conflict, and allows only a United Nations rubber stamping contribution
thereto, forced the hands of the three other members of the Quartet of
international UN, EU and Russian mediators in Middle East peace making
to subscribe to the three Israeli preconditions to recognize the outcome
of the Palestinian 2006 elections and lift the siege.
Ironically
the comatose former Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon had proclaimed
the Oslo accords "dead" as soon as he assumed power and rolled the tanks
of the Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) to sweep away the political map
drawn on the ground by those same accords when, first, they reoccupied
the PA autonomous areas in the West Bank in 2002 and, second, they
besieged the Nobel Peace laureate Arafat, who was the Palestinian
partner to those same accords, for three years in his bedroom until his
death in 2004.
The demand that Palestinians unilaterally commit,
collectively and individually, to those preconditions again highlights
the Israeli lack of reciprocity by ignoring for example the fact that
Avigdor Lieberman, the leader of "Israel Baituna," who publicly calls
for forced Arab population transfer, was allowed into Ehud Olmert's
ruling coalition as deputy prime minister and
minister of strategic affairs, or the fact that Benyamin Netanyahu,
the leader of the Likud, who is allowed to run in the upcoming Israeli
election for prime minister on a platform that refuses the Annapolis
process and its two state solution "vision."
Third, the Abbas
led PLO and PA, backed by their U.S. and Israeli Oslo partners, did
their best to prevent the empowerment of the Hamas only government and
later the Hamas led national unity government, which was formed under
the Hamas Fatah 2007 Mecca agreement, exploiting to the maximum
Fatah's dominant grip on the PA security agencies and civil bureaucracy
which was tightened all throughout the one party rule of Fatah since
1993, which in turn led Hamas to create their own "executive (police)
force," thus excluding an early national political partnership based on
the pluralistic outcome of the legislative elections, making the
gap wider between the two rival national movements, Fatah and Hamas, and
creating the dual legitimacy crisis between the elected Abbas presidency
and the elected Hamas led PLC.
Forth, emboldened by the
Annapolis process, the PLO now refuses reciprocal concessions and
persists with its "political coup d'etat," offering an impossible to
accept framework for reconciliation and adamantly insistent that Hamas
unilaterally ends its coup d'etat, dismantles its rule in Gaza and its
military wings outlawed by the PA, commits to PLO's political programme
and respects its signed accords with Israel, voluntarily agrees to give
up its electoral mandate by agreeing to go to early elections, i.e. to
transform itself into a carbon copy of Fatah as a precondition to join
the PLO and the PA as well as to run in the upcoming elections, which
all boil down to a Hamas complete surrender to its rival and indirectly
to the three Israeli U.S. preconditions.
This ongoing older
PLO coup d'etat to rule out the outcome of the last legislative
elections is certain to create the ideal incubator that sustains the
rift between the two rival movements as well as the separation between
Gaza and the West Bank, and to doom any reconciliation efforts, whether
through national dialogue or political mediation.
*
Nicola Nasser is a veteran Arab journalist based in Bir Zeit of
the Israeli occupied Palestinian West Bank.
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