The 'Other', Older Palestinian 
		Coup D'etat
      
		
        By Nicola Nasser
		ccun.org, December 6, 2008
		
        
 
Failing to substantiate for the President of the autonomous 
		Palestinian Authority (PA), Mahmoud Abbas, a credible "legal" basis to 
		extend his term from the Basic Law, which is the constitutional terms of 
		reference that govern the rotation of power and the renewal of the 
		executive, legislative and judicial branches of the PA, Abbas in his 
		capacity as the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine 
		Liberation Organization (PLO) convened the rubber stamping Fatah 
		dominated Central Council (CC) of the PLO in the West Bank city of 
		Ramallah to elect him also President of the State of Palestine on 
		November 23.
 
The move could have been the last "constitutional" 
		resort to extend his term as PA president before it expires on January 9 
		next year in order to secure himself as the supreme "legitimate" 
		authority on Palestinian decision making in the context of the "make - 
		or  break" bloody wrangling with the rival Hamas on the leadership of 
		the Palestinian national movement.
 
The symbolic position secures 
		his presidency for life in line with the "tradition" of his predecessor, 
		but without any constitutional stipulation to support it as the PLO 
		regulations lack even an official text of a presidential oath, an 
		embarrassing fact that threw his senior aides into a whirlwind of 
		frenzied last minute efforts to write down an oath for him to read out 
		on November 23.
 
The position has been vacant since the death of 
		late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in 2004. The PLO lawmakers in 
		exile withheld the position from Abbas because they were demanding a 
		separation between the PA presidency and the PLO chairmanship as a 
		precautionary measure lest Israeli tanks bulldoze away the PA as they 
		did in 2002 taking down with it the PLO, the internationally  
		recognized sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, 
		which legitimized the creation of the "Palestinian National Authority" 
		(PNA) in 1993 as a subsidiary reporting to the PLO.
 
Dropping 
		their demand was dictated by the rivalry with Hamas and the so far 
		failed Arab, mainly Egyptian, mediation efforts between the PLO and the 
		Islamic Resistance Movement to resolve the dual legitimacy crisis, which 
		resulted from the landslide electoral victory of Hamas in the January 
		2006 legislative election, a crisis that was exacerbated by the ensuing 
		Israeli  U.S. siege into a bloody showdown that brought Hamas in June 
		2007 to be the de facto ruler of the Gaza Strip and at the same time 
		created the existing de facto separation with the PLO  led West Bank.
		 
Abbas' move was intended to pre-empt an expected vacuum in power 
		after announcement by Hamas that it would not recognize him as PA 
		president after January 9 while insisting on its opposition to holding 
		simultaneous early presidential and legislative elections before the 
		Hamas  dominated Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)'s mandate 
		expires in January 2010. The League of Arab Nations had warned against 
		any vacuum in power in the Israeli occupied Palestinian territories in 
		the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which the league anticipates as a 
		realistic possibility that threatens to relieve Israel of legitimate 
		Palestinian negotiating partners and consequently of its obligations in 
		accordance with the U.S.  sponsored Annapolis diplomatic process.
 
		PLO commitment to the Annapolis understandings was a milestone that 
		vindicated Hamas fears and accusations that Abbas was leading and 
		pursuing an older political coup d'etat to deprive the Islamic movement 
		from its electoral victory and at the same time, for all practical and 
		realpolitic reasons, foreclosed Abbas' options to end what his 
		leadership condemns as Hamas' military coup d'etat in Gaza through 
		national dialogue or political mediation.
 
Commitment or 
		non-commitment to what the Quartet of the US, EU, UN and Russian 
		mediators in Middle East peace  making described as the "Annapolis 
		Process" in a statement they released after their meeting in the 
		Egyptian Red Sea resort of Sharm el-Sheikh on November 8 has become the 
		terms of reference to make or break the Palestinian unity of ranks, 
		which has so far failed the Egyptian mediation efforts, the latest in a 
		series of national, Arab and non-Arab similar reconciliation endeavors.
		 
The Annapolis conference, which was hosted by the United States in 
		Meryland on November 27, 2007 and attended by all members of the Arab 
		League, convened with much fanfare and re-launched the Palestinian  
		Israeli negotiations after a seven  year interruption since the 
		collapse of the trilateral Camp David summit with the U.S. in 2000.
 
		In Annapolis, Arab leaders and the Palestinian presidency were lured by 
		a promise of a Palestinian state by the end of 2008 and a wider Arab  
		Israeli peace process therafter, mainly on the Syrian track, to coexist 
		with the inter-Palestinian divide between the PLO and Hamas and to 
		grudgingly hide their bitter resentment of the U.S.  Israeli threat of 
		siege, which had aborted Qatari, UAE, Saudi, Egyptian, Yemeni and other 
		Arab and non  Arab mediation efforts to unify Palestinian ranks, as 
		well as two landmark inter  Palestinian accords (the Cairo agreement in 
		2005 and the "national consensus accord," known as the "prisoners' 
		document" agreement the next year).
 
The Annapolis plan to 
		implement the first stage of the 2003 Road Map for a Palestinian  
		Israeli political settlement has built on two pillars, the first a 
		Palestinian  Israeli security coordination that is solely and directly 
		monitored by three senior U.S. generals, namely James Jones, William 
		Fraser and Keith Dayton, and the second pillar is the inter  
		Palestinian divide between Ramallah and Gaza.
 
However, the 
		failure of the "Annapolis process" could be better proved by the unmet 
		deadline of 2008 and the un-honored promise of a Palestinian state, but 
		the two pillars nonetheless survived the failure of Annapolis so far to 
		perpetuate and exacerbate the Palestinian rift, with the security 
		coordination raising accusations by Hamas of PLO collaboration with 
		Israel and the divide developing into what threatens to become a 
		permanent separation between the West Bank and Gaza.
 
There 
		remain too at the core of the Annapolis process and at the heart of the 
		Palestinian divide the three Israeli  U.S. "good conduct" preconditions 
		that qualify Palestinians to be partners to peace negotiations as well 
		as to evade military siege, economic blockade and diplomatic isolation, 
		namely to unilaterally renounce violence without any guarantees of 
		Israeli reciprocity, recognize the existence of the state of Israel 
		without any Israeli reciprocal recognition of the state of Palestine, 
		and commitment to the accords signed by the PLO with Israel regardless 
		of Israeli reciprocal respect thereto.
 
Israel's lack of 
		reciprocity has come recently under spotlight by the refusal of the U.S. 
		State Department to publish a report by its Middle East security envoy 
		General James Jones on Palestinian  Israeli security, which the Israeli 
		newspaper Haaretz, quoted by AFP on November 26, described in August as 
		"an extremely critical report of Israel's policies" in the West Bank and 
		Gaza Strip."
 
It is now public knowledge that the Palestinian 
		partner to the Annapolis process, represented by President Abbas, the 
		PLO and the PA, are wholeheartedly committed thereto irrespective of any 
		Israeli reciprocity. The emergency meeting of the Arab foreign ministers 
		in Cairo on November 26 concluded similarly committal, encouraged 
		beforehand to let go the undelivered promises of the Annapolis 
		conference by indications floated by both the Israeli President Shimon 
		Peres and the U.S. President  elect Barak Obama's team of their 
		willingness to deal with the collective Arab peace initiative.
 
		Hamas is consequently left in the cold to fend off a Palestinian and 
		Arab diplomatic isolation as much as to survive the Israeli ongoing 
		economic blockade and military siege, "hopefully" to gradually be 
		finished off or alternatively to surrender to those same three 
		preconditions to which its Palestinian rival had subscribed to as early 
		as the Oslo accord was signed with Israel in Washington D.C. in 1993.
		 
More out of presuming the weakness of Hamas than out of feeling a 
		strength in his own position, but stiffening his back with the U.S. and 
		Israeli determination to push hard with their three pre-qualifications, 
		President Abbas feels safe enough to persistently reiterate his 
		commitment to Annapolis and to corner the besieged Islamic movement to 
		either dismantle voluntarily or otherwise being swept away in a way or 
		another,  and he is on record as saying recently that the end of 
		the "black coup d'etat" in Gaza is only a matter of time.
 
		However the end game of the Annapolis process is still far away from 
		being the only game in the town as it is held hostage to Hamas' fate as 
		much as it has cornered Hamas, but meanwhile this process remains the 
		detrimental factor that makes or breaks the unity of Palestinian ranks, 
		as long as both Palestinian protagonists continue to risk it out in 
		their brinkmanship policies.
 
President Abbas in a public speech 
		commemorating the forth anniversary of Arafat's death on November 11 
		reiterated his commitment to Annapolis, condemned the Hamas "black coup 
		d'etat" in 2007, and held Hamas responsible for the inter - Palestinian 
		political and geographical split with the West Bank as well as for the 
		failure of the "national dialogue" and the collapse of several Arab 
		mediation efforts to end the Palestinian divide.
 
Ironically, 
		Abbas' US  led backers rarely use his "coup d'etat" label to describe 
		the violent Hamas showdown with the security forces loyal to him in Gaza 
		more than a year ago as they have their own labels, mostly derived from 
		terrorism, to exclude Hamas.
 
However, in retrospect Hamas "black 
		coup d'etat" in Gaza was in fact the result of a much wider, deeper and 
		older political and military coup d'etat that is still ongoing to 
		deprive Hamas from its democratically  won victory in the legislative 
		elections of January 2006, pre-empt the repetition of that bitter 
		democratic process to guarantee by all means the exclusion of Hamas or 
		similar Palestinian political orientation, and to reinstate Israel's 
		Palestinian partner to the Oslo peace accord of 1993, namely the Abbas  
		led PLO and its autonomous PA in the West Bank, as the sole legitimate 
		representative of the Palestinian people in any future Palestinian 
		elections, be it presidential, legislative or municipal.
 
The 
		anti  Hamas coup d'etat began, First, when Israel and the United States 
		led an internationally - imposed collective punishment on the 
		Palestinian people, under Israeli occupation since 1967, by enforcing an 
		economic, financial, political and diplomatic siege on the Hamas-led 
		government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip immediately after the 2006 
		legislative election, which was facilitated by more than $220 million 
		U.S. and European taxpayers' money and brought Hamas to power in a 
		landslide electoral victory that stunned both the European Union and 
		United States donors to the democratic process and the Jimmy Carter  
		led international monitors who testified to the fair, free and 
		transparent elections.
 
Second, the U.S. sponsor who monopolizes 
		the peace  making process in the Arab and Palestinian  Israeli 
		conflict, and allows only a United Nations rubber stamping contribution 
		thereto, forced the hands of the three other members of the Quartet of 
		international UN, EU and Russian mediators in Middle East peace  making 
		to subscribe to the three Israeli preconditions to recognize the outcome 
		of the Palestinian 2006 elections and lift the siege.
 
Ironically 
		the comatose former Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon had proclaimed 
		the Oslo accords "dead" as soon as he assumed power and rolled the tanks 
		of the Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) to sweep away the political map 
		drawn on the ground by those same accords when, first, they reoccupied 
		the PA autonomous areas in the West Bank in 2002 and, second, they 
		besieged the Nobel Peace laureate Arafat, who was the Palestinian 
		partner to those same accords, for three years in his bedroom until his 
		death in 2004.
 
The demand that Palestinians unilaterally commit, 
		collectively and individually, to those preconditions again highlights 
		the Israeli lack of reciprocity by ignoring for example the fact that 
		Avigdor Lieberman, the leader of "Israel Baituna," who publicly calls 
		for forced Arab population transfer, was allowed into Ehud Olmert's 
		ruling coalition as deputy prime minister and
		
		minister of strategic affairs, or the fact that Benyamin Netanyahu, 
		the leader of the Likud, who is allowed to run in the upcoming Israeli 
		election for prime minister on a platform that refuses the Annapolis 
		process and its two  state solution "vision."
 
Third, the Abbas 
		 led PLO and PA, backed by their U.S. and Israeli Oslo partners, did 
		their best to prevent the empowerment of the Hamas  only government and 
		later the Hamas  led national unity government, which was formed under 
		the Hamas  Fatah 2007 Mecca agreement, exploiting to the maximum 
		Fatah's dominant grip on the PA security agencies and civil bureaucracy 
		which was tightened all throughout the one party rule of Fatah since 
		1993, which in turn led Hamas to create their own "executive (police) 
		force," thus excluding an early national political partnership based on 
		the  pluralistic outcome of the legislative elections, making the 
		gap wider between the two rival national movements, Fatah and Hamas, and 
		creating the dual legitimacy crisis between the elected Abbas presidency 
		and the elected Hamas  led PLC.
 
Forth, emboldened by the 
		Annapolis process, the PLO now refuses reciprocal concessions and 
		persists with its "political coup d'etat," offering an impossible  to  
		accept framework for reconciliation and adamantly insistent that Hamas 
		unilaterally ends its coup d'etat, dismantles its rule in Gaza and its 
		military wings outlawed by the PA, commits to PLO's political programme 
		and respects its signed accords with Israel, voluntarily agrees to give 
		up its electoral mandate by agreeing to go to early elections, i.e. to 
		transform itself into a carbon copy of Fatah as a precondition to join 
		the PLO and the PA as well as to run in the upcoming elections, which 
		all boil down to a Hamas complete surrender to its rival and indirectly 
		to the three Israeli  U.S. preconditions.
 
This ongoing older 
		PLO coup d'etat to rule out the outcome of the last legislative 
		elections is certain to create the ideal incubator that sustains the 
		rift between the two rival movements as well as the separation between 
		Gaza and the West Bank, and to doom any reconciliation efforts, whether 
		through national dialogue or political mediation.
 
* 
		Nicola Nasser is a veteran Arab journalist based in Bir Zeit of 
		the Israeli  occupied Palestinian West Bank.
		
		
      
      
      
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