Bush's Farewell Gift to Israel: UN Resolution
1850
By Nicola Nasser
ccun.org, December 30, 2008
The body of UN Security Council Resolution 1850 avoids any
meaningful mention of a two-state solution or the creation of a
Palestinian state with the exception of a feeble reference late in the
text -- added almost as an afterthought -- to "preparation for
statehood". While the preamble does mention Resolution 1514, issued five
years ago, and notes that "lasting peace can only be based on an
enduring commitment to mutual recognition, freedom from violence,
incitement, and terror, and the two-state solution, building upon
previous agreements and obligations," and even notes "the importance of
the Arab peace initiative of 2002" the seven articles of the resolution,
adopted on 16 December, focus on committing all parties to continuing an
endless peace process.
The outgoing US president "personally"
sponsored Resolution 1850, which on the surface was intended to placate
Palestinian negotiators before Bush's meeting with President Mahmoud
Abbas on 19 December. Bush has failed to fulfill his twice-made promise
to usher in a Palestinian state, once by the end of 2005 and the second
time by the end of this year. The resolution was intended to ensure
Palestinian negotiators remain committed to the "Annapolis process" in
which Bush's failure to produce positive results is no less dismal than
his failure to fulfill his promises to the Palestinian president by
means of securing a UN rubber stamp on the process. The UN's backing of
the Annapolis process is supposed to preempt any attempt to wriggle out
of it on the part of a new Israeli government. According to recent
opinion polls, the most likely victor will be Likud leader Benyamin
Netanyahu, who has made no secret of his opposition to the Annapolis
process and vision. But as its record amply demonstrates Israel has
never respected UN resolutions, confident that regardless how grossly it
abuses them it will enjoy the backing of Washington.
Israel's
unreserved welcome of the resolution betrays the fact that this gesture,
ostensibly in favour of the Palestinian negotiators, is in essence a
parting gift from Bush to the Israeli occupying power. The Israeli
Foreign Ministry statement lauded the Security Council for having
"endorsed, for the first time, the three Quartet principles as the basis
for international legitimacy and support for any Palestinian
government". The resolution was an expression of the council's
"unequivocal support for direct bilateral negotiations between Israel
and the Palestinians, in the framework of the Annapolis process, in
accordance with principles agreed by the parties themselves and
represented to the Quartet, including the principle that any agreement
will be subject to roadmap implementation, which requires first and
foremost the dismantling of the terror infrastructure". By "terrorist
infrastructure", of course, the statement means the Palestinian
resistance. It should also be borne in mind that Israel's agreement to
the roadmap comes with a codicil of 14 "reservations" approved by
Washington in Bush's notorious letter to Ariel Sharon of 14 April 2004,
and which the Palestinians have dubbed "the second Balfour declaration".
No surprise, therefore, at the Foreign Ministry's barely restrained
jubilation at what it described as "an unequivocal message to the Hamas
terrorist regime in Gaza" and the Security Council's "endorsement of
core Israeli principles for the peace process".
The statement
also included Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni's comment on the resolution:
"Today's Security Council resolution constitutes international
endorsement for the Annapolis process in keeping with the guiding
principles established by the parties, namely: direct bilateral
negotiations between the parties, without international intervention,
and according to the principle that nothing is agreed until everything
is agreed, a commitment to the Quartet principles -- recognising Israel,
ending terror and accepting former agreements -- as well as conditioning
implementation of any future agreement on the implementation of the
roadmap." She adds, pointedly, "the Security Council's clear support is
a vote of confidence in the process that Israel is advancing with the
legitimate Palestinian leadership and that has no substitute."
Meanwhile, Palestinian negotiators found nothing in the resolution clear
enough to warrant a warm official welcome. They therefore restricted
themselves to generalities and ambiguities in the hope of disguising the
peril looming over the Palestinian cause from the UN's decision to
confer legitimacy on the Annapolis project, which is intended to prolong
and exacerbate Palestinian rifts. The resolution simultaneously imperils
what the Palestinian president has called the PLO's "national project"
because it renders that project, the PLO and the PA, dependent upon a
peace process that has been stunted in substance but the duration of
which remains open. It is difficult to see such a process achieving any
progress, all the more so since the UN resolution did not invoke Article
7 of the UN Charter, which would have made it binding on all parties.
The most PA officials could come up with was that the resolution was
"encouraging".
The only possible interpretation of this welcome
(which was not shared by important Fatah and PLO leaders such as Farouq
Al-Qadoumi and Taysir Quba'a) is that the Fatah leadership has seized
upon the Security Council's "commitment to the irreversibility of the
bilateral negotiations" that began in Annapolis on 27 November 2007
(Resolution 1850, Article 1) as a potential weapon to wield in the face
of its rival in the national rift and as a means to press forward with a
negotiating agenda that is rejected by Hamas and other major factions in
the PLO, as well as by the majority of Palestinians according to polls
conducted by research centres in Ramallah, Nablus and Bethlehem. Bush's
farewell gift to Israel thus promises to become another obstacle to add
to already existing domestic obstacles to any successful national
dialogue.
In order to better appreciate the price the
Palestinians will pay for continuing with the Annapolis process and the
roadmap it might be useful to cite US Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice's remarks to the Security Council in defence of the resolution:
"Reforms in the Palestinian Authority in 2003 had inspired hope, yet
they had proved to be superficial, and the hope deceptive." (Does anyone
out there remember that Arafat was PA president at the time?) "The
Palestinian elections in January 2005 and the Israeli disengagement from
Gaza later that year had provided hope that had soon been ended by the
election victory of Hamas in 2006. Finally, after Hamas had usurped
power in Gaza in 2007, it had become clear to all that there was no
alternative to the Bush vision."
Rice's disregard of the
Palestinian people's right to choose their leaders, her declaration from
the most important international forum that elimination of Arafat and,
now, Hamas, is the price the Palestinians have to pay to achieve her
president's utopian vision, recalls the arrogance her president
displayed six years ago. On 4 June 2002, at the height of Israeli
incursions into PA territory which culminated in the siege on Arafat's
compound and eventually his death, Bush called for a new Palestinian
leadership and declared, "When the Palestinian people get a new
leadership, new institutions, and new security arrangements with their
neighbours [he meant the Israelis of course, not the Arabs], the US will
support the creation of a Palestinian state."
This is recent
history. When we place Resolution 1850 in its context, we can better
appreciate how generous a gift Bush left Israel.
*Translated
into English from Arabic by Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue No. 927, 25 - 31
December 2008 (http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/927/op2.htm).
Submitted by the author for publication in ccun.org, on December 28,
2008.
** The writer is a veteran Arab journalist based in Bir
Zeit, West Bank of the Israeli-occupied Palestine.
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